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INTRODUCTION 
 On January 23, 2012, the United States Supreme Court issued a unanimous 
decision in United States v. Jones, ruling that the warrantless installation of a Global-
Positioning-System (GPS) tracking device on a criminal suspect’s vehicle constitutes a 
search under the Fourth Amendment, which forbids “unreasonable searches and seizures.”1 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion held that the Court need not address the defendant’s 
privacy expectations since, at the time of its adoption, the Fourth Amendment prohibited 
the sort of physical trespass that occurred when law enforcement placed a GPS tracker on a 
Jeep registered to Jones’s wife. In a powerful concurrence, Justice Sotomayor took issue 
with the majority’s property-based inquiry, arguing that the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections extend beyond “trespassory intrusions on property” to instances when law 
enforcement violates a “subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as 
reasonable.” By limiting its Fourth Amendment inquiry to one based on common-law 
trespass, Sotomayor contended, the Court overlooked the “reasonable expectations of 
privacy” standard set forth in Katz v. United States (1967). Worse still, the Court ignored 
the reality that many types of government surveillance no longer require “physical 
intrusion” onto private property (United States v. Jones, 2012, 954-955).2                            
 In perhaps the most memorable portion of her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor 
voiced her willingness to reconsider the third-party doctrine, a strand of the Supreme 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 1 The text of the Fourth Amendment reads as follows: “The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
 2 Ironically, Sotomayor ultimately endorsed a trespass-based approach, joining the property 
rationale of Justice Scalia’s opinion along with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and 
Thomas. While concurring in the result of the majority opinion, Justices Ginsburg, Brennan, and 
Kagan joined a separate concurrence by Justice Alito in which Alito argued that the Court should 
have conducted a Katz-based inquiry into whether installation of the GPS tracker violated Jones’s 
“reasonable expectations of privacy.” See Stephen E. Henderson, “After United States v. Jones, After 
the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine,” North Carolina Journal of Law and Technology 14, 
no. 2 (Spring 2013), 448-452.  
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Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence holding that individuals enjoy no reasonable 
expectations of privacy, and thus no Fourth Amendment protection, over “information 
voluntarily disclosed to third parties” like banks, telephone companies, or Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs). This doctrine, Sotomayor asserted, is “ill suited to the digital age, in 
which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the 
course of carrying out mundane tasks” (United States v. Jones, 2012, 957). While the 
United States Supreme Court held in cases such as United States v. Miller (1976) and 
Smith v. Maryland (1979) that the Fourth Amendment does not protect material shared 
with third parties, state appellate courts are free to offer greater levels of protection to such 
material under their own state constitutions. In this thesis, I aim to illuminate the legal 
and political factors that might lead state courts to avail themselves of state constitutions 
in recognizing citizens’ privacy expectations over information shared with third parties.  
 This essay takes shape as follows: First, I delineate the concept of new judicial 
federalism, whereby state appellate courts are free to offer greater protections under state 
constitutions than the minimum levels of protection established by the United States 
Supreme Court. Here, I explain the legal means that empower state appellate courts to 
reject the federal third-party doctrine by capitalizing on state constitutional provisions, 
especially search-and-seizure analogs and privacy provisions. Second, I explore the 
Supreme Court’s landmark third-party doctrine jurisprudence, tracing the Court’s rulings 
in Olmstead v. United States (1928), Katz .v United States (1967), United States v. Miller 
(1976), Smith v. Maryland (1979), and California v. Greenwood (1988). Third, I review the 
literature on new judicial federalism and the third-party doctrine, demonstrating how my 
thesis fills gaps in existing scholarship. Fourth, I enumerate my hypotheses and underlying 
theoretical assumptions. Fifth, I explain my methodology for building a population of state 
third-party doctrine cases, collecting and coding data, and conducting statistical analyses to 
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test my hypotheses. Finally, I discuss the results of my analyses, which show that judicial 
ideology and the presence of a state constitutional privacy guarantee both shape state 
judges’ calculus about whether to protect third-party material under state constitutions.  
I.  New Judicial Federalism and the Third-Party Doctrine 
 In 1977, Justice William Brennan, the Supreme Court’s longtime liberal stalwart, 
introduced the concept of new judicial federalism. In a foundational Harvard Law Review 
article, Brennan urged state courts to utilize their state constitutions to provide higher 
levels of protection for individual liberties than those afforded by the United States 
Supreme Court. This rallying cry to state courts sprung from what Brennan regarded as 
the Supreme Court’s alarming conservatism during the tenure of Chief Justice Warren 
Burger (1969 – 1986). The Burger Court veered from the Court’s robust protection of civil 
liberties and criminal suspects rights under Chief Justice Earl Warren (1953 – 1969). While 
leaving unscathed many of the Warren Court’s most lauded decisions on matters like school 
desegregation and legislative reapportionment,3 the Burger Court attracted criticism for 
“whittling down the greater civil libertarian advances of the Warren Court,” especially in 
the realm of criminal suspects’ rights (Howard 1976; Israel 1977, 1322).4  
 Maligning the Burger Court’s “door-closing decisions,” Brennan (1977, 495) 
applauded state courts for “construing state constitutional counterparts of provisions of the 
Bill of Rights as guaranteeing citizens of their states even more protection than the federal 
provision, even those identically phrased.” Establishing his role as the “intellectual 
godfather of the new judicial federalism,” Brennan presented state courts and constitutions !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
          3 See Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and Reynolds v. Sims 377 U.S. 533 
(1964), respectively.  
 4 Justice Brennan (1977, 496-498) lists numerous Burger Court decisions that, in his view, 
diluted the rights of criminal suspects. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), 
upholding warrantless searches of automobiles following routine traffic stops; Gustafson v. Florida, 
414 U.S. 260 (I973), condoning full searches of lawfully detained suspects; South Dakota v. 
Opperman, 96 S. Ct. 3092 (1976), upholding full warrantless searches of impounded cars.  
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as a potential remedy for conservative Burger Court doctrine (Tarr 1999, 1112). Legal 
historians note that the robust state constitutionalism Brennan envisioned constituted a 
mere “rediscovery of state constitutions,” which served as the “primary vehicle for 
protecting individual rights” until federal courts assumed a more active role in protecting 
civil liberties in the 1930s (Tarr 1999, 1099-1100). Nevertheless, most legal scholars credit 
Brennan’s 1977 article with reviving state appellate courts’ use of state constitutions to 
augment federal doctrine.  
 In the United States’ federal judicial system, state appellate courts enjoy 
“unquestioned, final authority to interpret their state constitutions” (Friedman 2000, 100). 
This power stems from the “adequate and independent state grounds” doctrine. Established 
by the Supreme Court in such cases as Murdock v. City of Memphis (1874), Herb v. Pitcairn 
(1945), and Michigan v. Long (1983), the independent state grounds doctrine stipulates that 
federal courts have no jurisdiction to review state court decisions grounded in state 
provisions that stand independent from federal law.5 While U.S. Constitutional rights 
incorporated to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment establish a “minimum of 
protection from which the states may not subtract” (Howard, Graves, and Flowers 2006, 
847), the U.S. Constitution does not require state courts to interpret state constitutions in 
harmony with the Bill of Rights nor prohibit state courts from offering more expansive 
protections than those provided by federal courts (Abrahamson 1985, 1156; Van Cleave 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 5 It is worth noting that two of the landmark third-party doctrine holdings explored in this 
paper affirm the ability of state appellate courts to apply their state constitutions toward more 
protective ends than the United States Supreme Court. Dissenting in United States v. Miller (1976, 
1629), Justice Brennan highlights several state cases included in my analysis as examples of the 
“emerging trend among high state courts of relying upon state constitutional protections of 
individual liberties protections . . . increasingly being ignored by decisions of this Court.” Writing for 
the majority in Greenwood v. California (1988, 1630), Justice White acknowledged that “individual 
States may surely construe their own constitutions as imposing more stringent constraints than the 
does the Federal Constitution.” 
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1998, 206; Wilkes 1974, 426-431).6                                                                                  
 While these decisions and analyses seemingly embolden state appellate courts to 
offer additional protections under their state constitutions, some legal scholars question the 
“legitimacy of independent state constitutional interpretation in cases where there are also 
similar or identical federal constitutional guarantees” (Williams 1999, 1055).7 Rebuking 
new judicial federalism as a euphemism for “unprincipled” evasion of federal doctrine, 
Barry Latzer (1991, 865) argues that by using state constitutional provisions to reject 
federal Fourth Amendment precedents, state appellate courts burden law enforcement with 
contradictory bodies of criminal law. These “mid-game rule changes” make it difficult for 
law enforcement officers without legal training to recall doctrinal detail when making 
decisions “rapidly under trying circumstances” (Latzer 1991, 866).  Despite such criticisms, 
many judges and scholars embrace Justice Brennan’s conception of state appellate courts as 
“laboratories” for developing innovative approaches to “protect individual rights and 
promote the public interest” (Abrahamson 1985, 1192).                                                                                   
 Justice Brennan’s article followed on the heels of United States v. Miller (1976), a 
ruling Brennan cites as yet another example of the Burger Court’s “door-closing” 
jurisprudence. In Miller (1976), the Court established the third-party doctrine, ruling, in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 6 Judge Jeffrey Sutton of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit argues that while 
state courts may not ignore independent federal claims, they “remain free to construe their 
constitutional guarantees to offer as little protection as they think appropriate,” perhaps even less 
than the U.S. Constitution provides (Sutton 2011, 712). Given that constitutional claimants almost 
always present a federal claim, however, less protective state constitutional rulings would likely 
have little effect on most parties and would invite unfavorable review by a higher court.  
 7 Williams (1996, 1056) argues that state appellate courts betray an awareness of this “crisis 
of legitimacy” when they “attempt to formulate standards or criteria by which to justify their 
rejection of Supreme Court decisions.” State v. Gunwall 106 Wash.2d 54 (1986), a Washington 
Supreme Court decision from my data set, demonstrates the point. The Gunwall Court lists six 
factors it considers relevant when deciding whether its state constitutional provisions offer more 
protection than the federal constitution: “(1) the textual language [of both constitutions]; (2) 
differences in the texts; (3) constitutional history; (4) preexisting state law; (5) structural differences 
[between the two constitutions]; and (6) matters of particular state or local concern” (State v. 
Gunwall, 1986, 811). Several cases in my population look to similar or identical factors in deciding 
whether to offer broader rights under their state constitution.  
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Brennan’s words, that “none of us has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of 
our bank records, thus permitting governmental seizure of those records without our 
consent or knowledge” (Brennan 1977, 497). If Brennan’s vision of state courts as “font[s] of 
individual liberties” holds water, scholars might expect state appellate courts to engage in 
judicial federalism by ruling that, while the Fourth Amendment does not protect material 
shared with third parties, a state’s constitution does offer such protection.  
 All fifty state constitutions contain a search-and-seizure provision analogous to the 
Fourth Amendment, albeit with sometimes significant textual distinctions. Like the Fourth 
Amendment, these analog provisions protect against unreasonable searches and seizures 
and, to varying degrees, prohibit warrantless intrusions of citizens’ “persons, houses, 
papers, and effects” (Henderson 2006; Gorman 2007).8 Six states—Arizona, Hawai’i, 
Illinois, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Washington—have adopted search-and-seizure 
analogs with explicit references to citizens’ privacy interests.9 Six states—Alaska, 
California, Florida, Hawai’i, Illinois, and Montana—have adopted separate constitutional 
provisions that recognize citizens’ privacy rights.10 Armed with search-and-seizure analogs 
and privacy provisions, state appellate courts possess ample tools with which to counteract 
the third-party doctrine and make real Brennan’s vision of renewed state constitutionalism. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 8 Georgia’s analog, for example, is essentially coterminous with the text of the Fourth 
Amendment: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue except 
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation particularly describing the place or places to 
be searched and the persons or things to be seized” (Georgia Constitution, art. 1, sec. 1).  
 9 For example, South Carolina’s analog reads: “The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures and unreasonable 
invasions of privacy shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, the person or 
thing to be seized, and the information to be obtained” (South Carolina Constitution, art. 1, sec. 10, 
emphasis added, “invasions of privacy” clause added in 1971).  
 10 For example, Hawai’i’s right-to-privacy provision reads: “The right of the people to privacy 
is recognized and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.  The 
legislature shall take affirmative steps to implement this right” (Hawai’i Constitution, art. 1, sec. 6, 
amended in 1978).  
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 Far from a mere theoretical exercise, a court’s rejection of the federal third-party 
doctrine can have serious consequences for criminal defendants. In Commonwealth v. 
DeJohn 486 Pa. 32 (1979), a case in my data set, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
reversed Jill DeJohn’s third-degree murder conviction. In February 1976, Michael DeJohn, 
a decorated Vietnam War veteran, was found dead in his garage from a single gunshot 
wound to the head, his wedding band, wallet, and watch untouched. Jill DeJohn, the 
victim’s wife and mother of their two children, had mismanaged the family’s finances. As 
the family’s debts mounted, Jill DeJohn forged her husband’s signature on loan 
applications and tried to extort $5,000 from a neighbor. Michael DeJohn was insured for 
approximately $200,000, with his wife as his primary beneficiary. On the night of DeJohn’s 
murder, the only items missing from the DeJohn household were $50 in poker winnings 
and a .25 caliber pistol, the same weapon used to shoot Michael DeJohn and which Jill 
DeJohn told a neighbor she “knew how to use” (Com. v. DeJohn, 1979, 36).  
 Acknowledging that the jury had sufficient evidence to convict Jill DeJohn of her 
husband’s murder, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court nevertheless remanded her case for a 
new trial. Under Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the court held that 
police violated Jill DeJohn’s reasonable expectations of privacy by using an improperly 
issued subpoena to obtain incriminating bank records. Dismissing United States v. Miller 
(1976) as a “dangerous precedent” with “great potential for abuse,” the court ruled that 
unlike the Fourth Amendment, Pennsylvania’s search-and-seizure analog recognized 
citizens’ legitimate expectations of privacy in bank records. Because the defendant’s bank 
records were procured with an invalid subpoena and used to establish a motive a trial, 
Pennsylvania’s search-and-seizure analog demanded suppression of DeJohn’s bank records 
(Com. v. DeJohn, 1979, 49). Like so many cases in my sample, DeJohn illustrates the 
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tremendous power state courts’ third-party doctrine decisions hold not just for academic 
understandings of judicial federalism but also for criminal defendants.  
II. The Third-Party Doctrine – Landmark Cases 
 We embark now on a brief examination of how the federal third-party doctrine 
precedent evolved from the United States Supreme Court’s twentieth century search-and-
seizure jurisprudence.  
 Olmstead v. United States (1928): In 1928, the Supreme Court held in 
Olmstead v. United States (1928) that police officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment 
by wiretapping a criminal suspect’s private telephone line from a public street. Writing for 
a five-person majority, Chief Justice Taft reasoned that because the plain text of the Fourth 
Amendment protects citizens only in their “persons, houses, papers, and effects,” only a 
physical intrusion on these elements triggers Fourth Amendment protection. Since the 
police did not physically intrude on the Olmstead’s person or home, and because overheard 
telephone conversations are “neither papers nor effects,” the Court ruled that the act of 
wiretapping presented no Fourth Amendment violation (Olmstead v. United States, 1928, 
464). Olmstead inaugurated a new phase in the Court’s approach to Fourth Amendment 
violations, presenting “physical penetration of a protected area” as the touchstone for 
determining whether state action constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment (Kerr 2012, 81). While post-Olmstead decisions have understood Olmstead as 
placing the common-law “trespass test” at the center of Fourth Amendment inquiries, 
scholars like Orin Kerr (2012, 81) argue that the Olmstead Court was careful to distinguish 
“physical penetration from the technical doctrine of trespass.” Indeed, Chief Justice Taft’s 
majority opinion mentions “trespass” only twice.11 Regardless, Olmstead effectively limited !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 11 Kerr’s contention that “no trespass test was used in the pre-Katz era” problematizes the 
historical rationale of Justice Scalia’s Jones (2012) opinion. While Scalia frames Jones as trumpeting 
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the scope of search-and-seizure violations to instances in which law enforcement physically 
intruded on criminal defendants’ “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” The physical 
intrusion standard would dominate Fourth Amendment inquiries until 1967.   
 Katz v. United States (1967): In Katz v. United States (1967), the Supreme 
Court shifted the “Fourth Amendment focus from property to privacy” (Thompson 2014, 8). 
Tasked once more with deciding whether warrantless wiretapping violated the Fourth 
Amendment, the Katz Court settled the issue with an approach decidedly different from the 
one it adopted in Olmstead. By 1967, the Warren Court’s progressivism had reached its 
zenith. Since becoming Chief Justice in 1953, Earl Warren had overseen major changes in 
the Court’s jurisprudence on equal protection, voter apportionment, and criminal 
procedure, issuing landmark rulings in Brown v. Board of Education (1954), Mapp v. Ohio 
(1961), Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), Reynolds v. Sims (1964), and Miranda v. Arizona 
(1966). Two years before hearing argument in Katz, the Court acknowledged a clear, 
though somewhat amorphous, right to privacy, ruling in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) 
that “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights” cast “penumbras” that together form 
constitutionally protected “zones of privacy” (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965, 1681).!Though 
the Court as a whole has never specified the constitutional provisions that establish 
Americans’ right to privacy, Griswold nevertheless affirmed the right’s existence, laying a 
foundation for the Court’s ruling in Katz.   
 Addressing a fact pattern analogous but not identical to Olmstead’s, the Katz Court 
ruled that law enforcement officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they taped a 
microphone to the top of a public phone booth in order to listen in on a criminal suspect’s 
telephone conversations. Though the placement of the microphone “involved no physical !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
the “return of the trespass test for what is a Fourth Amendment ‘search,’” Kerr (2012, 1-3) presents 
persuasive arguments that “there is no trespass test to restore.” 
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penetration of the telephone booth,” and the booth itself was not the defendant’s personal 
property, the Court held that the police nevertheless “violated the privacy upon which 
[Katz] justifiably relied while using the telephone booth.” Dismissing the “premise that 
property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize,” Justice Stewart 
wrote for the Court that the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places.” The trespass 
rationale of Olmstead no longer controlled Fourth Amendment inquiries (Katz v. United 
States, 1967, 511-5112). In an influential concurrence, Justice Harlan articulated a 
standard for determining the conditions under which citizens can expect Fourth 
Amendment protection. In Harlan’s estimation, Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure 
protections apply in settings where citizens exhibit “an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy” that “society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’” (Katz v. United States, 1967, 
516). Called the “reasonable expectations of privacy” standard, Harlan’s test continues to 
shape the Court’s modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  
 While I argue in that Katz marked a bold turn in the Supreme Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence—one the Burger and Rehnquist Courts curbed by announcing 
the third-party doctrine—it bears noting that Katz and a series of Warren Court decisions 
before Katz sowed the seeds from which the third-party doctrine sprouted. In a string of 
“agent-informer” or “false friend” cases spanning from 1952 to 1971, the Court maintained 
that individuals who speak to undercover government informants about criminal activity 
enjoy no privacy interests in the content of their conversations. By voluntarily conversing 
with another person about unlawful activity, individuals assume the risk that their 
confidantes might relay incriminating information to police (Thompson 2014, 7-9).12 
Collectively, as Justice Stewart asserted in Katz, the agent-informer cases establish the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 12 See Lee v. United States 343 U.S. 427 (1963); Lopez v. United States 373 U.S. 427 (1963); 
Lewis v. United States 385 U.S. 206 (1966); Hoffa v. United States 385 U.S. 293 (1966); and United 
States v. White 401 U.S. 745 (1971).  
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principle that the Fourth Amendment does not protect “what a person knowingly exposes to 
the public” (Katz v. United States, 1967, 511). While Katz and the agent-informer cases 
paved the way for the third-party doctrine in Miller (1976) and Smith (1979), the latter 
decisions still signal a sharp turn from Katz by dismissing as wholly unreasonable any 
expectation of privacy in information shared with third parties. Moreover, the agent-
informer cases are primarily concerned with the risk individuals assume when conversing 
with others, not instances, as in Miller (1976), Smith (1979), and Greenwood (1988), where 
individuals convey tangible transactional data to third party entities like banks, telephone 
companies, and garbage collectors (Thompson 2014, 9).13  
 United States v. Miller (1976): Almost a decade after Katz and seven years 
into Warren Burger’s tenure as Chief Justice, the Supreme Court narrowed the 
circumstances under which criminal defendants could claim reasonable expectations of 
privacy when it ruled in United States v. Miller (1976) that a criminal suspect’s Fourth 
Amendment rights were not violated when law enforcement subpoenaed the suspect’s bank 
for his financial records. Citing the reasonable expectations test set forth in Justice 
Harlan’s Katz concurrence, Miller argued that the warrantless procurement of his bank 
records violated his reasonable expectations of privacy and thus offended the Fourth 
Amendment. Relying on agent-informer precedent like Hoffa (1966) and White (1971), the 
Court rejected these claims. Writing for a seven-justice majority, Justice Powell held that 
Miller enjoyed no “legitimate expectation of privacy” in the content of financial records 
“voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of 
business.” Simply put, the subpoenaed bank documents were not “respondent’s ‘private !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 13 I did not include state appellate cases concerning agent-informer or false-friend scenarios 
in my data set, because I view the Supreme Court’s agent-informer precedent as a precursor to the 
modern third-party doctrine. Since I am concerned with state court reactions to the third-party 
doctrine, which did not ripen until Miller (1976) and Smith (1976), I focus on how state courts have 
addressed Miller, Smith, and subsequent federal precedent rather than rulings like White (1971).   
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papers’” but rather the “business records of the banks.” Because the subpoenaed bank 
records raised no constitutionally recognized privacy interests, the Fourth Amendment 
imposed no warrant or probable cause requirement, allowing government officials to 
subpoena third party records for the purpose of criminal prosecution (United States v. 
Miller, 1976, 440-442). The Miller Court scaled back the scenarios subject to Katz’s privacy-
driven inquiry and heralded the arrival of the modern third-party doctrine.  
 Smith v. Maryland (1979): Three years after Miller (1976), the Court cemented 
the third-party doctrine in Smith v. Maryland (1979), ruling that police officers did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment when, without a warrant or court order, they installed a pen 
register to obtain phone numbers dialed out of a criminal suspect’s home telephone line. 
Lauding Justice Harlan’s reasonable expectations of privacy test as the “lodestar” of Fourth 
Amendment inquiries, the Court extended Miller’s rationale to telephone records. Justice 
Blackmun’s majority opinion asserted that telephone users do not maintain reasonable 
expectations over the telephone numbers they dial, since all users “realize that they must 
‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone company” for calls to be completed. Since Miller 
established that an individual has “no legitimate expectations of privacy in information he 
voluntarily turns over to third parties,” Smith abandoned his expectation of privacy when 
he “voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and ‘exposed’ 
that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business” (Smith v. Maryland, 
1979, 2580-2582). While the Court extended the third-party doctrine to different settings 
during the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts, Smith (1979) marks the Supreme 
Court’s last major “pronouncement on the parameters of the third-party doctrine” 
(Thompson 2014, 12). The decision stands as a significant supplement to the initial 
announcement of the doctrine in Miller, since, unlike in Miller, Smith condoned 
governmental procurement of third-party materials obtained without subpoenas, court 
!! 15 
orders, or any judicial oversight whatever. Thus, Smith establishes the principle that third-
party materials enjoy no Fourth Amendment protection “no matter how egregious the police 
conduct which results in governmental acquisition of the information,” a breathtaking 
departure from the level of protection suggested by the Warren Court in Katz (1967) 
(LaFave 1987, 511).14   
 California v. Greenwood (1988): Since cases concerning garbage collection are 
well represented in my data set, a brief exploration of California v. Greenwood (1988) is in 
order.15 One of the most noteworthy extensions of the third-party doctrine because of its 
relevance for criminal drug prosecutions, Greenwood (1988) upheld the warrantless search 
and seizure of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of a home. Writing for the 
majority, Justice White applied Smith’s rationale, noting that while Greenwood may have 
maintained some subjective expectation of privacy in the contents of his garbage, society 
would not accept this expectation as reasonable since the defendant placed his refuse “at 
the curb for the express purpose of conveying it to a third party, the trash collector.” It is 
“common knowledge,” White contended, that garbage left by the street for collection is 
“readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the 
public” (California v. Greenwood, 1988, 1628-1629). Here, as in Smith, the Court employed 
the third-party doctrine to uphold a search conducted without any judicial authorization.  
 Since the Court’s announcement of the third-party doctrine in Miller (1976) and Smith 
(1979), attorneys, judges, and scholars of all stripes have presented arguments supporting 
and decrying the doctrine. In perhaps the most coherent defense, Orin Kerr (2009) argues !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 14 To demonstrate the point, LaFave (1987, 511) notes that in United States v. Payner, 447 
U.S. 727 (1980), the Court applied the third-party doctrine to a scenario in which IRS agents 
“arranged to have [the defendant’s] bank records obtained by burglary.” 
 15 Cases concerning garbage left for collection account for 73 of the 218 cases in the 
population, the largest case type represented. Most garbage cases involve drug prosecutions in which 
police discover evidence of narcotics in garbage left for collection. 
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that the third-party doctrine serves two critical purposes. First, Kerr contends, the doctrine 
ensures the “technological neutrality of the Fourth Amendment,” allowing law enforcement 
easy access to evidence of sophisticated criminal third-party exchanges technological 
advances have rendered unobservable through traditional surveillance (Kerr 2009, 516; 
Thompson 2014, 16). Second, Kerr argues that the third-party doctrine “creates ex ante 
clarity by matching the Fourth Amendment rules for information with the Fourth 
Amendment rules for location.” By holding that materials shared with a third party receive 
the same protection as all other materials stored with that third party—by doctrinally 
“erasing the history” and place of origin of third-party materials—the third-party doctrine 
permits law enforcement to treat all materials stored in the same place in the same fashion. 
This reflects the reality that police will “normally know the status of the place they search 
but not the history of the items found inside it” (Kerr 2007, 581-582).  
 Still, other scholars denounce the third-party doctrine as poorly reasoned and out of 
step with modern life. Wayne LaFave (1987, 507-511) calls Miller “dead wrong” and Smith 
a “crabbed interpretation of the Katz test.” In LaFave’s view, both decisions rest on the 
faulty proposition that the Fourth Amendment protects only matters that are “absolutely, 
100% private.” This standard belies even the Court’s pre-Katz jurisprudence, which often 
protected individuals in settings that did not provide “absolute privacy” (LaFave 1987, 
508).16 Furthermore, LaFave contends, the third-party doctrine grounds Fourth 
Amendment determinations in “property concepts” of “ownership and possession” Katz held 
no longer dispositive of Fourth Amendment inquiries (LaFave 1987, 511-512). 
 Numerous scholars take issue with the third-party doctrine’s assumption that 
individuals “voluntarily” convey materials to third parties (Thompson 2014, 18; LaFave !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 16 In United States v. Chapman (1961), for example, the Court protected tenants from 
warrantless police intrusion even though a landlord’s ability to enter the premises negated tenants’ 
absolute privacy in rented dwellings.  
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1987, 515). Dissenting in Miller, Justice Brennan asserted that disclosure of one’s financial 
affairs to a bank is “not entirely volitional, since it is impossible to participate in the 
economic life of contemporary society without maintaining a bank account” (United States 
v. Miller, 1976, 451). Such concerns about the doctrine’s practicability echo Justice 
Sotomayor’s Jones concurrence, which deems the third-party doctrine “ill suited to the 
digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third 
parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks” (United States v. Jones, 2012, 957).  
 The Burger and Rehnquist Courts’ third-party doctrine rulings in Miller (1976), Smith 
(1979), and Greenwood (1988) constitute major breaks from the high level of privacy 
protection advanced by the Warren Court in Katz (1967). These federal precedents present 
ample opportunities for state appellate courts to use their search-and-seizure analogs and 
privacy provisions to offer more protection for third-party material than the Supreme Court 
provides under the Fourth Amendment. If Brennan’s vision of new judicial federalism holds 
true, we should expect to see post-Miller state appellate courts wielding their state 
constitutions to counteract the Burger and Rehnquist Courts’ third-party doctrine rulings.  
III. Literature Review 
 My analysis of state appellate courts’ treatment of the third-party doctrine fills 
several gaps in the literature on new judicial federalism and search-and-seizure 
jurisprudence in the fifty states. Most glaring, no scholar has conducted sustained empirical 
analysis of state appellate courts and the third-party doctrine. Henderson (2006) provides a 
useful descriptive catalog of how each state’s judiciary had addressed the federal third-
party doctrine as of 2006. However, his compendium of third-party doctrine holdings is not 
comprehensive, and he conducts no empirical analysis to determine the legal or political 
factors that might explain why some states choose to protect third-party materials and 
others embrace the rationale of Miller, Smith, and Greenwood. By examining state court 
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activity since 2006, my work offers a much-needed update to Henderson’s article; a handful 
of states have rejected the federal third-party doctrine since 2006. Gorman (2007) compiles 
the text of each state’s search-and-seizure analog and privacy provisions, as well as 
statements from each state judiciary about how courts should interpret their analogs in 
relation to the Fourth Amendment.17 However, Gorman (2007) presents no quantitative or 
qualitative analysis of how state courts have utilized their analog and privacy provisions to 
address the federal third-party doctrine.  
 At least five studies of state appellate decisions account for the influence of state 
constitutional provisions. Examining state search-and-seizure decisions from 1981 to 1993, 
Howard, Graves, and Flowers (2006) found that the presence of a state constitutional 
privacy guarantee had no significant effect on whether a state court grounded its search-
and-seizure jurisprudence in state constitutional provisions or federal doctrine. Similarly, 
Flemming, Holian, and Mezey (1998) found that the presence of a privacy guarantee in a 
state’s constitution had no significant impact on a state’s propensity to issue pro-privacy 
decisions; instead, justices’ religious and partisan affiliations significantly predicted 
support for privacy claims. Examining the effect of state equal protection clauses on state !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 17 I refer to such pronouncements as “statements of interpretive approach.” While these 
statements constitute non-binding dicta, I hypothesize they may yet offer cues to state court judges 
presented with opportunities to diverge from the federal third-party doctrine. Compare statements 
made by appellate courts in Hawai’i, a state that has rejected the federal third-party doctrine in a 
number of contexts, with statements made by courts in Wisconsin, a state that has embraced federal 
third-party doctrine holdings on at least six occasions. In State v. Tanaka, 67 Haw. 658701 P.2d 1274 
(1985), the Hawaii Supreme Court noted, “Art. 1, Sec. 7 of the Hawaii Constitution recognizes an 
expectation of privacy beyond the parallel provisions in the Federal Bill of Rights.” In comparison, 
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals has stated, “Wisconsin courts interpret the search and seizure 
provisions of the state and federal constitutions identically” (State v. Yakes, N.W. 2d 108 (1999), 
quoting State v. Rewolinski (1990)).  
 Other state courts’ statements of interpretive approach are far more neutral in tenor. In 
People v. Sporleder, 666 P. 2d 135, 140 (1983), the Colorado Supreme Court noted, “Although Art. II, 
Sec. 7 of the Colorado Constitution is substantially similar to its federal counterpart, we are not 
bound by the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment when 
determining the scope of state constitutional protections.” Though its statement of interpretive 
approach would not necessarily compel greater protection, Colorado has consistently provided 
greater protection for third party materials under its analog.  
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courts’ equal protection decisions, Fino (1987) found that neither the presence of an equal 
protection clause nor the degree of specificity of the clause had a significant effect on 
whether state courts based equal protection decisions on state or federal grounds.  
 A few scholars have found some relationship between state constitutional provisions 
and case outcomes. Lovell (2012) examined the role of Blaine Amendments, state 
constitutional provisions that prohibit state funds from reaching religious schools, in state 
courts’ religious liberties jurisprudence. While the effect of Blaine Amendments was not 
statistically significant, Lovell (2012) found a relationship between a courts’ reliance on its 
Blaine Amendment and decisions to provide higher levels of religious liberties protection. 
Similarly, Emmert and Traut (1992) found that while states usually relied on federal 
doctrine when reviewing state statutes between 1981 and 1985, states were more likely to 
invalidate statutes when their constitution included a relevant provision with no federal 
analog. While the literature as a whole provides mixed support for the significance of state 
constitutional provisions, Lovell (2012) and Emmert and Traut (1992) provide some basis 
for my hypothesis that the text of a state’s analog and the presence of a state constitutional 
privacy provision might prove critical to state third-party holdings.  
 Numerous studies have probed state appellate criminal procedure jurisprudence for 
evidence of new judicial federalism. Overall, scholars seem to have reached a consensus 
that though state constitutions are an “important source of additional rights” for criminal 
defendants, state courts have not become the “leaders in civil liberties” Brennan envisioned 
(Cauthen 2000, 1202). Examining state criminal procedure decisions from 1969 to 1989, 
Latzer (1991) found that regardless of the state court’s prestige or the criminal procedure 
issue in question, states were far more likely to adopt Burger and Rehnquist Court 
precedents than to offer more expansive protections for criminal suspects under state 
constitutions. Using Latzer’s data set, Beavers and Walz (1998) offered little analysis of the 
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frequency of states engaging in judicial federalism but found that longer judicial terms and 
support from a liberal citizenry made it more likely for state courts to offer greater 
protection under their state constitutions. Exploring state supreme court decisions in 
takings, search-and-seizure, and self-incrimination cases from 2000 to 2010, Nelson (2014) 
found that elected judges were less likely to base decisions on state grounds. In addition, 
case outcomes requiring the suppression of evidence were more likely to rely on state 
constitutional provisions than federal doctrine.  
 A few studies widen their aperture from specific cases to state courts’ criminal 
procedure decisions over years or decades. Cauthen (1999, 539) examined 528 state high 
court criminal procedure decisions between 1970 and 1994, finding that “both across states 
and within individual states,” the rate at which state courts have extended greater 
protection to criminal suspects has varied significantly since the beginning of the Burger 
Court in 1969. While the rate at which state courts used state constitutions to offer greater 
protections was high in the early 1970s, “activism was limited to few states rendering 
relatively few state constitutional decisions” (Cauthen 1999, 539). Interestingly, Cauthen 
(1999) found that between 1981 and 1990, a higher percentage of state courts relied on 
their state constitutions in criminal procedure cases, though heightened reliance on state 
constitutions did not lead to heightened protection for criminal suspects. This demonstrates 
that reliance on state constitutional provisions does not necessarily entail divergence from 
federal doctrine. In a subsequent study, Cauthen (2000) examined state high court 
decisions from 1970 to 1994 to determine whether a state’s propensity to engage in judicial 
federalism depends on the legal issue presented in the case. Cauthen (2000) found that 
states were most likely to offer greater protection than federal doctrine in cases concerning 
the free exercise of religion, jury trials, and governmental searches and seizures. These 
results support my primary hypothesis that state appellate courts might engage in judicial 
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federalism in cases concerning the seizure of materials stored with third parties. 
 An abundance of research demonstrates the potency of federal constitutional doctrine 
in state judicial decisionmaking. In a study of state high court cases concerning the 
applicability of United States Supreme Court precedent from 1994 to 2006, Kassow, Songer, 
and Fix (2012) found that the vitality of the federal precedent in question, measured in part 
by the number of justices in the majority, significantly predicted whether state courts 
adopted federal doctrine or relied on independent state grounds.18 Though they did not 
focus on search-and-seizure cases specifically, Beavers and Emmert (2000) examined more 
than 500 state high court reviews of state legislation, concluding that state courts were 
especially likely to base civil liberties decisions on federal doctrine rather than independent 
state grounds. Hoekstra (2005) found that federal precedent dominated state labor cases 
from 1900 to 1940, while Esler (1994) and Tarr and Porter (2012) found similar effects in 
their respective studies of state self-incrimination and gender discrimination cases.   
 Taken together, then, the literature indicates that state courts faced with the choice of 
federal doctrine or independent state constitutional grounds will likely adopt federal 
doctrine. Scholars and judges have attempted to determine why state constitutional law 
remains so underdeveloped. Esler (1994, 31-32) identifies several factors underlying state 
court reliance on federal doctrine, including a long “history of federal judicial dominance,” 
textual similarities between federal and state constitutional provisions, and ingrained 
preferences for prosecuting under federal rather than state law, especially in a growing 
number of cases where state and federal law enforcement collaborate. Tarr and Porter !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 18 At least two of the landmark third-party doctrine cases addressed in this paper resulted in 
near-unanimous rulings. Miller (1976) was decided a by 7-2 majority, with Justices Brennan and 
Marshall dissenting, while Greenwood (1988) was decided by a 6-2 majority, with Justice Kennedy 
recused and Justices Brennan and Marshall in dissent. A more narrow majority decided Smith 
(1979); the Court split 5-3, with Justice Powell recused and Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stewart 
dissenting. Thus, by Kassow et. al’s standards, at least two of the three federal third-party rulings I 
focus on would likely be classified as enjoying a high degree of vitality.    
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(1982) hypothesize that federal law dominates because litigants and lawyers prefer to bring 
federal claims in a federal forum. In a Harvard Law Review article published just months 
after Brennan’s January 1977 article, Burt Neuborne (1977, 1126) argues that civil liberties 
lawyers should prefer federal forums since the federal bench attracts gifted judges and 
clerks steeped in the “libertarian tradition” of Locke and Mill. Unlike state judges, 
Neuborne argues, federal judges possess the requisite talent to parse “complex, often 
conflicting lines of authority” and settle constitutional questions in “competently written, 
persuasive opinions” (Neuborne 1977, 1120).  
 Some observers fault law school curriculums for deemphasizing state law, arguing 
that lack of exposure to state constitutional law leads attorneys to bring only federal claims 
where they could bring state and federal constitutional claims. Arguing that litigators 
should prefer “two arrows in their quiver” to one, Judge Jeffrey Sutton of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit posits that law schools devalue state constitutional 
law because of the “undue length” of state constitutions; the relative ease with which state 
constitutions can be amended; and the perceived negative effect of state judicial elections on 
the quality of state constitutional interpretation (Sutton 2011, 688-711). Interestingly, 
Sutton (2011, 711) argues that Justice Brennan’s 1977 article may have stunted the 
development of state constitutional law. In Sutton’s view, Brennan framed judicial 
federalism as a “liberal ratchet” and encouraged attorneys to adopt an opportunistic view of 
state constitutions at the expense of principled arguments that the “language, context, and 
history” of state constitutions compel greater civil liberties protections.   
 My analysis of state appellate courts’ third-party doctrine holdings promises to build 
on the current literature in several ways. First, while studies have examined judicial 
federalism in criminal procedure cases, scholars have not focused specifically on the third-
party doctrine or the role of states’ search-and-seizure analogs and privacy provisions on 
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third-party holdings. Second, most of the extant literature on state criminal procedure 
cases covers state high court activity only until the mid-1990s. By covering more than 200 
cases spanning from 1968 to 2014, my project adds years of valuable data.19 Third, most 
studies only examine state court activity starting with the beginning of the Burger Court. 
To determine whether Brennan’s model of judicial federalism has prevailed, I examine state 
court activity both before and after the Burger Court. If state courts offered greater 
protection under state constitutions to third-party materials both before and during the 
Burger Court, we could safely state that the causal mechanism of judicial federalism is not 
state courts’ reaction to Burger Court decisions, as Brennan’s article supposes, but rather 
some other factor. Fourth, nearly all of the studies to date account only for state courts of 
last resort, while this paper covers both state high court decisions and intermediate state 
appellate court decisions not appealed to high courts. To overlook these mid-level appellate 
decisions would be to miss a substantial number of definitive third-party doctrine 
holdings.20 Finally, while many studies offer insight into the factors that prompt state 
courts to rely on independent state grounds, fewer studies assess whether courts basing 
decisions on state constitutional provisions provide greater or the same levels of protection 
as the United States Supreme Court. As my analysis demonstrates, state courts can base 
decisions on their state constitutional analogs and privacy provisions but still offer the 
same level of protection as federal doctrine. By coding case outcomes based on both the use 
of state constitutional provisions and the level of protection provided, my project offers 
insight not simply into whether states make use of their constitutions but how they do so.   
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 19 Though I searched for state appellate third-party rulings between 1952, the beginning of 
the Warren Court, and 2014, the earliest year a ruling in my data set was decided is 1968. 
 20 My data set includes 73 cases from mid-level state appellate courts and 145 cases from 
state courts of last resort.  
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IV. Hypotheses and Theoretical Support 
 Three models of judicial decisionmaking provide theoretical support for my 
hypotheses. The legal model posits that judges are “motivated to establish an accurate, 
clear, and consistent interpretation of the law” in light of precedent, the text of relevant 
statutory and constitutional provisions, and the intent of these provisions’ authors (Segal 
2011, 18). In sharp contrast, the attitudinal model asserts that judges marshal facts and 
legal texts to suit their own “ideological attitudes and values” (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 86). 
Reflecting the widespread approval the attitudinal model enjoys among political scientists, 
many studies on judicial decisionmaking account for judicial ideology and find judges’ 
ideological preferences have a significant impact on case outcomes (Segal and Cover 1989; 
Segal et. al 1995).21 Baum (2006) proposes a third paradigm of judicial decisionmaking in 
which judges act to earn respect from key “audiences,” such as fellow judges, attorneys, the 
public, or the media. Under this model, we should expect to see judges act in ways that 
reflect the interests or views of their audiences, either because these audiences help 
advance a judge’s career or because judges hope to accrue regard from “people whose 
esteem they care about” (Baum 2006, 21). 
 While most political scientists believe the legal model obscures the true basis for 
judges’ decisions, namely judges’ ideological preferences, some scholars balk at the strict 
division between legal and ideological motivations. Baum (2011, 76) rejects the dichotomy 
between law and politics, arguing instead that “legal and policy considerations are 
entwined in the processes through which judges make their choices.” Others rebuff the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 21 Segal and Spaeth’s attitudinal model centers on United States Supreme Court justices, 
who are theoretically free to ignore legal constraints and pursue policy preferences because their 
decisions cannot be reviewed. Segal and Spaeth (2002) would likely argue that the attitudinal model 
does not apply in the state appellate context, since state court judges are tethered to legal 
constraints. However, state high court justices faced can avoid judicial review by basing third-party 
decisions on independent state grounds and are thus theoretically as free as United States Supreme 
Court justices to pursue personal policy preferences.  
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formal division between law and politics by asserting that “law is politics,” an enterprise in 
which indeterminate legal language and frequent interactions with governmental actors 
compel judges to reach political decisions (Cross 2011, 92-93). Thus, to hypothesize that 
legal factors shape a state judge’s decisions is not to assert that law trumps ideology but 
rather to acknowledge the interconnectedness of the two.  
 While I expect judicial ideology to exert influence in the case outcomes included in my 
data set, I also predict that certain legal constraints will shape state appellate judges’ 
decisions about whether to offer greater protection to third-party materials under state 
constitutions. These legal constraints include federal and state precedent, the text and 
structure of state constitutions, and legal history.  
 My first two hypotheses concern the influence of U.S. Supreme Court decisions like 
Miller (1976), Smith (1979), and Greenwood (1988) on state courts’ third-party rulings. 
When adjudicating federal claims, state courts may not offer less protection than the 
minimum protections established by federal courts’ interpretations of the U.S. Constitution. 
Ample statistical evidence demonstrates that state appellate courts feel the weight of 
federal precedent and are far more likely to adopt it than to develop state constitutional law 
(Kassow, Songer, and Fix 2012; Tarr and Porter 2012; Hoekstra 2005). If the legal model 
holds true, we could reasonably expect federal third-party decisions to act as a constraint on 
state court judges, who, because of a “long history of federal judicial dominance,” may feel 
pressure to adopt federal doctrine and offer the same level of protection established by the 
Supreme Court (Esler 1994, 31-32).  
 This expectation, however, that federal third-party doctrine precedent will render 
state judges less likely to engage in judicial federalism belies the underlying logic of Justice 
Brennan’s 1977 Harvard Law Review article. Under Brennan’s model of judicial federalism, 
the presence of conservative Burger and Rehnquist Court rulings like Miller (1976), Smith 
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(1979), and Greenwood (1988) should function not as a constraint on state courts but as a 
catalyst. Primed by the Warren Court to regard federal courts as the wellspring of 
progressive civil liberties jurisprudence, state courts, Brennan argues, will be alarmed by 
Burger and Rehnquist Court decisions that seem to renege on its most celebrated rulings. 
Faced with deficient federal protections, Brennan (1977, 503) predicts state courts will 
“step into the breach” and use state constitutions to “expand constitutional protections.” 
Brennan’s conception of new judicial federalism, then, suggests that the presence of 
conservative federal doctrine will make it more likely for state courts to offer greater 
protection for third-party materials under search-and-seizure analogs and privacy 
provisions. Given these conflicting expectations about how federal precedent might affect 
state courts’ third-party doctrine rulings, I offer the following two hypotheses:  
 (H1a) State court decisions decided after relevant federal third-party doctrine 
rulings—Greenwood (1988) for all garbage cases; Miller (1976) for all non-garbage cases—
will be less likely to result in judicial federalism than decisions issued before relevant 
federal third-party doctrine rulings.22  
 (H1b) State court decisions decided after relevant federal third-party doctrine 
rulings—Greenwood (1988) for all garbage cases; Miller (1976) for all non-garbage cases—
will be more likely to result in judicial federalism than decisions issued before relevant 
federal third-party doctrine rulings. 
 Drawing on the same theoretical bases, I offer similar hypotheses about the extent to 
which the legal issue presented by a case may affect the court’s treatment of the third-party !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 22!For both (H1a) and (H1b), Smith (1979) is excluded as a temporal marker. Because Smith 
is typically viewed as a natural extension of Miller (1976), and Miller marks the earliest definitive 
emergence of the federal third-party doctrine, all non-garbage cases are viewed in light of their 
temporal relation to Miller. Because garbage cases account for such a large portion of the cases in my 
data set, and because Greenwood (1988) holds special sway in garbage cases, all garbage cases are 
coded in light of their temporal relation to Greenwood.  !
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doctrine. I predict that if the issue matches one covered by federal third-party doctrine 
precedent—namely, financial records (Miller); telephone records (Smith); or garbage left for 
collection (Greenwood)—these issue areas will trigger either the constraint or the catalyst 
presented by federal precedent. While these hypotheses may seem distinct from those 
presented above, which focus on whether a state court ruling falls before or after Miller 
(1976) or Greenwood (1988), both constitute different ways of accounting for the impact of 
federal third-party doctrine holdings. If a state case concerns a third-party issue at play in 
federal precedent, the legal model suggests that states may feel pressure to adopt the 
federal precedent. Brennan’s model of new judicial federalism, however, suggests that when 
the legal issue presented corresponds with a conservative Burger or Rehnquist Court 
decision, the issue will trigger state courts to provide more protection under state 
constitutions. In light of these conflicting expectations, I offer two hypotheses:   
 (H2a) State court third-party doctrine rulings that concern the same issues presented 
in landmark federal third-party doctrine decisions—namely, financial records (Miller); 
telephone records (Smith); and garbage left for collection (Greenwood)—will result in 
judicial federalism less often than decisions that do not concern the same issues presented 
in landmark federal third-party doctrine decisions.   
 (H2b) State court third-party doctrine rulings that concern the same issues 
presented in landmark federal third-party doctrine decisions—namely, financial records 
(Miller); telephone records (Smith); and garbage left for collection (Greenwood)—will result 
in judicial federalism more often than decisions that do not concern the same issues 
presented in landmark federal third-party doctrine decisions.   
 The legal model posits that, like federal precedent, a state’s own precedent imposes a 
powerful constraint. The doctrine of stare decisis theoretically compels judges to show 
deference to prior rulings to give the law “a quality of connectedness, an appearance of 
!! 28 
stability” (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 76). While adherents to the attitudinal model argue that 
judges defer to precedent only when it aligns with their policy preferences, judges like 
Nancy Vaidik of the Indiana Court of Appeals rebuke political scientists’ “underestimation 
of the role of precedent,” insisting that genuine respect for precedent plays an enormous 
role in judicial decisionmaking (Sullivan, Vaidik, and Barker 2011, 333). Some scholars 
acknowledge a middle ground between the two positions, arguing that while sincere 
devotion to precedent may not fully explain case outcomes, precedent nevertheless can 
“serve as a constraint on [judges] acting on their personal preferences” (Knight and Epstein 
1996, 1021). In the context of state third-party doctrine rulings, then, we might expect that 
states will be influenced by prior decisions to adopt federal doctrine or protect third-party 
materials under their state constitutions. I hypothesize:  
 (H3) If at the time of a given decision, a state court has previously used its state 
constitution to offer greater protection to materials conveyed to third parties, the state 
court will be more likely to extend greater protection to third-party materials again.  
 Distinct from but in the same vein as state court precedent, statements of interpretive 
approach—non-binding declarations by state courts about how a state’s analog or privacy 
provision should be interpreted in relation to the Fourth Amendment—may also affect state 
courts’ third-party rulings. If the legal model is correct that state precedent constrains state 
courts, so, too, might statements that a search-and-seizure analog offers greater or the 
same levels of privacy protection as its federal counterpart. By issuing statements about the 
scope of a state analog’s protection in comparison to the Fourth Amendment, state courts 
effectively “establish the interrelation of the two guarantees,” imposing a legal constraint 
on judges in subsequent cases (Sutton 2011, 712). Statements suggesting more extensive 
protection than the Fourth Amendment should theoretically result in greater protection for 
third-party materials, while statements suggesting lockstep interpretation with the Fourth 
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Amendment should result in adoption of federal precedents like Miller (1976), Smith (1979), 
and Greenwood (1988). Thus, I predict:  
 (H4) If a state third-party doctrine ruling cites a prior statement that the state’s 
search-and-seizure analog provides more protection than the Fourth Amendment, the 
ruling will be more likely to offer greater protection to materials shared with third parties 
than decisions that do not cite such statements.  
 The legal model asserts that judges base their decisions in large part on the meaning 
of relevant statutory or constitutional texts (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 53). While proponents 
of the attitudinal model argue that imprecise legal language allows judges to bend texts to 
suit their ideological preferences, some judges, Justice Antonin Scalia foremost among 
them, insist that the text of legal provisions drives, or should drive, case outcomes.23 
Furthermore, several studies cited above suggest that the text and structure of state 
constitutions exerts some influence on state appellate case outcomes (Lovell 2012; Emmert 
and Traut 1992). Thus, it is not unreasonable to expect that when deciding whether state 
search-and-seizure analogs or privacy provisions offer more protection to materials shared 
with third parties than the federal Constitution, state courts might look to the text of those 
provisions and the overall structure of their state constitutions.  
 Many states’ search-and-seizure analogs contain significant textual departures from 
the Fourth Amendment that suggest greater protection, such as references to privacy rights 
or enumerated protections from specific types of searches not proscribed by the Fourth 
Amendment. Under the legal model, state appellate judges might interpret these textual 
departures as signals that the analog provides higher levels of protection to third-party 
materials than the U.S. Supreme Court offers under the Fourth Amendment. Similarly, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 23 See Scalia, Antonin, and Bryan A. Garner. 2012. Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal 
Texts. St. Paul, MN: Thomson/West.  
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since the U.S. Constitution contains no explicit right to or mention of privacy, state 
constitutions equipped with provisions acknowledging citizens’ privacy rights provide an 
important structural cue that the state constitution offers more expansive civil liberties 
protections than the Fourth Amendment. Thus, I hypothesize:  
 (H5) Decisions handed down in states whose search-and-seizure analog texts suggest 
higher levels of privacy protection will be more likely to offer greater protection to 
materials shared with third parties than will decisions handed down in states whose analog 
texts suggest the same level of protection offered by the Fourth Amendment.  
 (H6) Decisions handed down in states whose constitutions include separate 
provisions recognizing citizens’ privacy interests or whose analogs contain explicit mention 
of privacy interests will be more likely to offer greater protection to materials shared with 
third parties than decisions issued in states without explicit privacy protections.   
 Though not explored in the literature in great detail, state constitutional history may 
also offer state appellate judges an important cue about the appropriate level of protection 
to offer under a state’s analog or privacy provision. Under the legal model, judges hoping to 
reach fair interpretations of state analogs and privacy provisions may find it helpful to 
examine the state’s historical level of protection against unlawful searches and seizures. 
One of the best available measures of a state’s historical level of protection against illegal 
searches and seizures is whether the state’s judiciary embraced the exclusionary rule—
which requires that unlawfully obtained evidence be suppressed from criminal trials—
before the Supreme Court required them to do so in Mapp v. Ohio (1961). Prior to Mapp 
(1961), some states required the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence while others 
admitted such evidence into criminal trials (Benner, Bird, and Smythe 2012). In 
determining whether state constitutional protections should extend to third-party 
materials, a state court judge may view heightened historical concern about improper 
!! 31 
searches and seizures as an indicator that the state constitution offers greater protection 
for criminal suspects than the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, I hypothesize:  
 (H7) If a third-party doctrine decision is decided in a state that excluded or 
partially excluded unlawfully obtained evidence from criminal trials between Weeks (1914) 
and Mapp (1961) (i.e. adopted the exclusionary rule prior to incorporation), the decision will 
be more likely to result in greater protection for materials shared with third parties.   
 We turn now to two hypotheses derived from the attitudinal model, which proposes 
that judges are motivated by a desire to see their personal policy preferences become law 
(Segal and Spaeth 2002). Some studies find that ideologically liberal judges tend to support 
more expansive civil liberties protections than ideologically conservative judges. In studies 
of President George H. W. Bush’s and President Clinton’s federal judicial appointees, 
scholars found that the role of judicial ideology was particularly pronounced in civil 
liberties cases, where liberal appointees were more likely to support broad civil liberties 
protections (Carp et. al 1993; Stidham, Carp, and Songer 1996). Thus, both the attitudinal 
model and empirical research suggest that judicial ideology might explain why some state 
appellate courts favor more expansive protections for third-party materials and others 
adopt less protective federal doctrine. Accordingly, I hypothesize that in a given case:  
 (H8) The more ideologically liberal the author of the majority opinion, the more 
likely the decision will offer greater protection to materials shared with third parties.   
 Under the attitudinal model, “policy-minded” judges are likely to decide cases in ways 
that “reduce the likelihood that a higher court will reverse [the] decision” (Nelson 2014, 4). 
Judges sitting on courts whose decisions are subject to review from higher judicial bodies 
must address the “threat of reversal,” sometimes assuming “positions that diverge from 
their own preferences in order to avoid reversals that would move policy even further from 
those preferences” (Baum 1997, 115). This means intermediate appellate court judges 
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subject to review by state high courts may be hesitant to find greater protection for third 
party materials under state constitutions, lest the state high court reverse and adopt 
federal third-party precedent. For state high courts whose decisions are reviewable by the 
United States Supreme Court, the attitudinal model suggests that state high court justices 
will decide cases in ways that reduce federal reversal. In the third-party doctrine context, 
the only way to ensure that federal reversal will not occur is to ground third-party holdings 
in independent state constitutional provisions. Former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has 
acknowledged that “especially in the constitutional context,” state appellate courts hold 
“substantial power to grant or withhold jurisdiction to the Supreme Court by the choice and 
articulation of the grounds for the state court decisions” (O’Connor 1984, 5). If we assume 
that judges with ideological reservations about the federal third-party doctrine are 
scattered on both intermediate and high courts, state high court justices should 
theoretically feel more emboldened to find greater protections for third-party materials 
under state constitutional provisions, since doing so removes their holdings from the ambit 
of federal review. I predict:   
 (H9) State high courts will more often hand down decisions that diverge from the 
federal third-party doctrine than will intermediate appellate courts.    
 Drawing on Baum’s audience-driven model of judicial decisionmaking, I hypothesize 
that the ideology of a state’s citizenry, the rulings of neighboring state appellate courts, and 
a state court’s reputation will all shape judges’ decisions to embrace federal doctrine or 
provide greater protection for third-party materials under state constitutions.  
 Assuming that judges have a “strong interest in retaining their positions,” and given 
that nearly 90 percent of state judges face regular elections, state court judges likely 
remain abreast of citizens’ political leanings (Baum 2006, 61). Baum (2006, 61-62) asserts 
that judges facing elections are particularly “vulnerable to attack for perceived leniency in 
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criminal justice.” At least one study shows that trial judges become “more punitive” when 
sentencing criminal defendants as elections draw near (Huber and Gordon 2004, 247). 
Some of the most revealing scholarship on the sway of judicial elections examines the effect 
of elections on death penalty appeals. Hall (1992) finds that state high court justices vote 
strategically in death penalty appeals to minimize electoral opposition. Several studies 
conclude that elected state judges are less likely than appointed judges to overturn death 
sentences (Blume and Eisenberg 1999; Brace and Boyea 2007). Thus, both Baum’s 
audience-focused model and political science research provide support for my expectation 
that elected judges may feel pressure to decide third-party doctrine cases in ways that will 
appeal to voters and project a tough-on-crime image, namely by allowing police easy access 
to third-party materials. I predict:  
 (H10) Third-party doctrine cases decided by elected judges will be less likely than 
cases decided by appointed judges to result in greater protection under state constitutional 
provisions for materials conveyed to third parties.  
 For the same reasons we might expect elected judges to decide third-party cases in 
ways that appeal to voters, we might also expect judges in general, particularly elected 
judges, to consider the political views of a state’s citizenry. Baum’s model suggests that 
judges want to issue decisions that comport with the political views of the public at large, 
either for electoral purposes or to facilitate smooth implementation of judicial decisions. 
Though elected judges have an obvious incentive to consider citizens’ ideology, an appellate 
court with appointed judges may court public favor to ensure “better implementation of its 
decisions” and “reduce the chances that other branches will limit or reverse those decisions” 
(Baum 2006, 63). Limited empirical evidence shows that judicial decisions often reflect the 
ideological preferences of a state’s populace (Shepherd 2009), and some evidence suggests 
that judges in states with a liberal citizenry are more likely to offer civil liberties 
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protections that extend beyond those provided by federal doctrine (Beavers 1998; Brody 
2002). With this theoretical and empirical foundation, I hypothesize:  
  (H11) Decisions issued in states with an ideologically liberal citizenry—as 
measured by close proximity to a presidential election in which a majority of the state’s 
citizenry voted for a Democratic candidate—will be more likely to result in judicial 
federalism than decisions issued in states with an ideologically conservative citizenry—as 
measured by close proximity to a presidential election in which a majority of the state’s 
citizenry voted for a Republican candidate.24   
 As noted above, one of the underlying reasons we might expect judges to decline to 
offer greater protection for third-party materials is the desire to present themselves as 
“tough on crime” and criminal defendants (Baum 2006, 62). Some empirical evidence 
suggests that judges are less likely to decide cases in favor of defendants whose crimes are 
particularly violent or involve several aggravating factors (Brace and Boyea 2007). Thus, it 
is reasonable to hypothesize that third-party cases involving violent crimes like homicide, 
rape, and the like will be less likely to result in greater protection for third-party materials 
than cases involving non-violent crimes like financial fraud or drug use. I predict:  
 (H12) Third-party doctrine cases involving violent crime will be less likely than 
cases involving non-violent crime to result in greater protection under state constitutions 
for third-party materials.  
 Baum (2006, 104) asserts that other courts in the “judicial community” stand as a 
“highly salient audience” for many judges. Since judges prefer to be “well thought of among 
professional peers,” Baum (2006, 104) predicts they will decide cases in ways that “enhance !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 24 There may be interaction effects between judicial elections (H10) and citizen ideology 
(H11). For instance, if an elected judge faces overwhelmingly liberal voters, we might expect the 
judge to be more, rather than less, supportive of criminal suspects rights. While I have not done so, 
future researchers may want to develop an interaction variable to account for these dynamics. 
Despite the potential for interaction effects, both (H10) and (H11) rest on solid theoretical ground.  
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their standing among other judges.” Latzer (1991, 197) discusses “horizontal federalism,” a 
dynamic whereby state courts look to the decisions of “sister state courts” to gauge the 
“latest development[s] in state law.” State courts seek company among other state courts, 
since joining a “solid lineup” of similar decisions on a given legal issue “bolsters a court’s 
feeling that its ruling is right” (Latzer 1991, 197). At least one study has found that a state 
court is more likely to issue a particular ruling if another court in its federal circuit or 
WestLaw reporting zone has already issued a similar decision (Benner, Bird, and Smythe 
2012).25 With this theoretical and empirical foundation, I hypothesize:  
 (H13) At the time of a given state decision, if a state court in the same federal circuit 
has previously offered greater protection under their state constitution to the type of third-
party material presented in the case in question, the case will be more likely to result in 
greater protection for third-party materials. 
 Finally, a state court’s reputational standing among other state courts may inform 
third-party doctrine holdings. Caldeira (1983, 84) asserts that “hierarchies of prestige” 
persist “between and among” state appellate courts, some of which are “more influential 
than others.” Assessing state high courts’ citations of other state courts in 1975, Caldeira 
ranks each state court’s prestige, finding that high courts in California, New York, and New 
Jersey exert the most influence over other state high courts. Comparing the 1975 rankings 
with rankings from 1920, Caldeira (1983, 93) finds “considerable movement” among less 
prestigious courts but stability across the fifty-year span for the most influential courts. 
States with socially diverse populations, progressive or liberal state policies, and higher 
levels of judicial professionalism demonstrated higher levels of prestige (Caldeira 1983, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 25 For general literature on policy diffusion among the fifty states, see Virginia Gray, 
“Innovations in the States: A Diffusion Study,” American Political Science Review (1973) 67, 1174-
1185, and Jack L. Walker, “The Diffusion of Innovations among the American States,” American 
Political Science Review (1969) 63, 880-899.  
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103). Since states with more prestigious courts tend to be ideologically liberal, and 
liberalism often correlates with support for broad civil liberties protections, there exists 
some theoretical basis for the idea that more prestigious state courts may be more likely to 
protect third-party records under state constitutions. Additionally, the audience-driven 
model of judicial decisionmaking suggests that courts with higher reputations among their 
peers may feel emboldened to break with federal doctrine and lead sister-states toward 
greater protections for third-party materials. I predict:  
 (H14) Third-party doctrine holdings issued by state courts with higher prestige will be 
more likely to engage in judicial federalism and protect third-party materials than 
holdings issued by state courts with less prestige.  
V. Methodology 
 The dependent variable in my analysis is the outcome of state appellate courts’ 
decisions to either adopt the federal third-party doctrine or provide greater protection to 
third-party materials under their state analogs and privacy provisions. To locate the 
population of state appellate third-party doctrine cases, I conducted a Westlaw search and, 
after cross-referencing my search results with cases listed in Henderson (2006), compiled a 
data set of 218 cases covering forty-six of the fifty states.26 The cases in my data set cover a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 26 My Westlaw search terms were as follows: “(‘third party’ ‘third-party’) & reasonabl! & 
expect! & privacy &co(high) &da(aft1952). In order to determine whether state courts’ third-party 
doctrine activism occurred in response to Burger and Rehnquist Court decisions or had already 
started during the Warren Court (i.e. whether state court activism on the third-party doctrine can 
really be called “new judicial federalism”), the results were restricted to cases after 1952, the year 
before Earl Warren became Chief Justice. The search returned 1,670 results. After reading the 
syllabus of each potential case, I selected 97 cases for inclusion in the data set.  
 Next, I cross-referenced these 97 cases with the list of third-party doctrine cases compiled by 
Henderson (2006). While nearly all of the pre-2006 cases from my Westlaw search also appeared in 
Henderson (2006), I discovered a number of cases listed in Henderson that had not appeared in my 
original Westlaw search. In total, I added 82 new cases to my population from Henderson (2006). 
After reading and coding these 179 decisions, I investigated other cases cited in those decisions, 
adding 39 new cases to the population for a total of 218 state appellate third-party doctrine cases.  
 My criteria for selection were as follows: If a state appellate decision concerned the question 
whether citizens maintain reasonable expectations of privacy in materials shared with third parties 
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variety of third-party doctrine issue types. Over 70 percent of the cases concern the issues 
presented by Miller, Smith and Greenwood: financial records, telephone records, and 
garbage left for collection. See Table 1 below for a full list of the issues covered by my data:  
Table 1. Third-Party Doctrine Issues Covered 
 
Third-Party Issue Type Number of Cases in my Sample 
Garbage Left for Collection 73 
Telephone Records (toll records, pen register scenarios) 46 
Financial or Bank Records 40 
Medical Records (Blood Alcohol, Prescription Records) 22 
Identifying Info (name, address) stored with third party 8 
Power Consumption or Utility Records 7 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) Subscriber Information 7 
Cell Service Location Information (CSLI) 5 
Miscellaneous Issues or Combination of the Above Issues 10 
Total Number of Cases 218 
 
While it is possible that a few cases remain, these 218 cases essentially represent the total 
population of cases since the beginning of the Warren Court in which state high and 
intermediate appellate courts have addressed whether citizens possess reasonable 
expectations of privacy in information or materials shared with third parties.27              
 After compiling my universe of state appellate third-party doctrine cases, I read 
each decision and coded the case’s outcome, my dependent variable, as a dummy variable. 
Decisions were assigned a 0 if the state court did not use its state constitution to provide 
greater protections than the United States Supreme Court for information or materials 
conveyed to third parties. Decisions were assigned a 1 if the state court used its state !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
and seized by law enforcement for criminal investigations, the decision was automatically included. 
A small number of civil cases were included but only if the opinion held clear implications for 
criminal cases. Cases concerning third-party consent, informer-agent or false-friend scenarios, 
overheard prison conversations, etc. were rejected. I did not include cases in which individuals 
merely exposed materials to the public; only cases in which an individual knowingly conveyed 
materials or information to an identifiable third party were included in the data set.  
 27 It is somewhat disconcerting that my original Westlaw search did not yield all 218 cases 
eventually selected for inclusion in the population. However, since my goal was not to build a 
representative sample of cases but rather to locate a comprehensive population of all the third-party 
doctrine cases decided by state appellate courts since 1952, the addition of cases beyond the Westlaw 
search does not pose a serious problem and, in fact, strengthens the validity of my results by 
bolstering the number of observations in the data set.   
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constitution to provide greater protections to third-party materials (i.e. if the state court 
engaged in new judicial federalism by rejecting the federal third-party doctrine).28  
 After reading each case in the population, I coded several independent variables to 
test my hypotheses. To evaluate the effect of federal third-party precedent (H1a, H1b), I 
created a dummy variable, assigning a 0 if the state decision came before Miller (1976) for 
non-garbage cases or before Greenwood (1988) for garbage cases, and a 1 if the case came 
after these federal decisions. I also coded based on whether the state appellate case 
corresponded with a legal issue presented in Miller, Smith, or Greenwood (H2a, H2b), 
assigning a 0 if the case did not involve financial records, telephone records, or garbage left 
for collection and assigning a 1 if the case did concern these issues. To assess statements of 
interpretive approach (H4), I created a dummy variable, assigning a 0 if the state appellate 
decision cited a statement of interpretive approach (regardless of whether the statement 
suggested greater or the same protection as the Fourth Amendment) and assigning a 1 if !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 28 I also coded case outcomes as an ordinal variable. Decisions were coded on a spectrum from 
full application of federal third-party precedent to total rejection of the third-party doctrine through 
the state analog or privacy provision. If a decision sidestepped a clearly presented third-party 
question or simply applied Miller (1976), Smith (1979), or Greenwood (1988) with no mention of the 
state constitution, the decision was coded as 0. If a decision applied federal third-party doctrine 
precedent through the state analog or privacy provision, it was coded as 1. If a decision provided 
greater protection than the Supreme Court for third-party materials but offered this protection 
under the Fourth Amendment instead of the state constitution, it was coded as 2. Such decisions are 
rare and involve third-party doctrine issues the United States Supreme Court has not explicitly 
addressed. Of the 218 cases, only two cases received this classification. If a decision provided greater 
protection for materials conveyed to third parties under the state analog or privacy provision (i.e. 
clearly engaged in new judicial federalism), the decision was coded as 3. 
 My final logit models remain stable regardless of whether I include the dummy or ordinal 
variable. For the ordinal variable, there is arguably little distinction between 0 (decisions that 
sidestep or apply federal doctrine with no mention of state analogs or privacy provisions) and 1 
(decisions that apply federal doctrine through state constitutional provisions), as both result in the 
adoption of federal doctrine. Thus, I use the dummy variable in my final statistical analyses.  
 Since the United States Supreme Court held in Miller (1976) and Smith (1979) that 
individuals enjoy no reasonable expectations of privacy in materials shared with third parties, and 
that these materials can be seized without a warrant, court order, or any judicial authorization, state 
appellate decisions could be classified as providing “greater protection” for both variables if, first, 
they established that citizens have reasonable expectations of privacy in the third-party material or 
information in question and, second, if they required some judicial authorization, whether subpoena, 
court order, or warrant, before law enforcement can seize the material. !
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the decision did not cite a statement of interpretive approach.29 
 I created additional dummy variables to account for whether a state high or 
intermediate appellate court decided a given case (H9) and to capture whether each case 
involved violent or non-violent crime (H12).30 I used U.S. Census Bureau regional 
categories to code each decision for the geographic region of the state court in which the 
decision was issued. There is no solid theoretical basis for predicting that state courts in 
certain geographic regions will be more or less likely to protect third-party material under 
state constitutions, but coding for this variable allows me to assess qualitatively whether 
state court activism on the third-party doctrine is concentrated in specific regions.31  
 To test the effects of judicial ideology (H8), I recorded the author of the majority 
opinion for each decision in the population and then referred to Bonica and Woodruff’s 
database of judicial ideology measures (Campaign Finance or “CF” scores) for state 
supreme court justices who either received or made political campaign donations between 
1979 and 2012. Departing from the standard measure of judicial ideology—Party Adjusted !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 29 Using Henderson (2006) and Gorman (2007) as a reference for statements not cited in the 
decisions in my population, I also created an ordinal variable to capture the level of protection 
suggested by statements of interpretive approach in a state court’s precedent. If a state court’s 
precedent contained no statement whatsoever, I assigned a 0. If a state court’s precedent contained a 
statement that the state analog should be interpreted in harmony with the Fourth Amendment, I 
assigned a 1. If a state court’s precedent contained a statement acknowledging that the state 
judiciary is free in rare circumstances to provide more protection than the United States Supreme 
Court, I assigned a 2. If a state court’s precedent contained a statement that the state analog or 
constitution provides more protection than the Fourth Amendment, I assigned a 3.  
 My final logit models remain stable regardless of whether I include the dummy or ordinal 
variable. For the ordinal variable, there is arguably no incremental difference in the level of 
protection suggested by decisions in states whose precedent contains no statement (0) and in 
decisions in states whose precedent contains statements that suggest lockstep interpretation (1). 
Thus, I use the dummy variable in my final statistical analyses.  
 30 For the dummy variable capturing the state court level, I assigned a 0 if an intermediate 
appellate court decided the case and a 1 if a state high court decided the case. 
 For the dummy variable capturing the severity of the crime involved, I assigned a 0 if the 
case involved non-violent crime like fraud, gambling, or drug use, and assigned a 1 if the case 
involved violent crime like murder, manslaughter, rape, armed robbery, etc.!!
 31 The U.S. Census Bureau divides states into four geographic regions: West, Midwest, 
South, and Northeast. For a full list of the states in each geographic region, see 
http://www2.census.gov/geo/docs/maps-data/maps/reg_div.txt.  
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Justice Ideology (PAJID) scores, developed by Brace, Langer, and Hall (2000)—Bonica and 
Woodruff (2014) developed a new measure, using political campaign contributions made to 
or by state supreme court justices to place a justice’s political ideology on a scale of -2.5 
(very liberal) to 2.5 (very conservative). As with all other measures, Bonica and Woodruff’s 
CF scores offer an imperfect measure of judicial ideology. Bonica and Woodruff (2014, 11) 
do not assign CF scores to intermediate appellate court judges and have not compiled CF 
scores for many justices who joined state high courts before 1990 and left before 2000.32 
However, Bonica and Woodruff’s CF scores are arguably preferable to PAJID scores, which 
Bonica and Woodruff (2014, 17) assert are “poor predictors of judicial voting patterns and 
only very loosely map onto the familiar liberal-conservative dimension that has come to 
define American political ideology.” In contrast, CF scores unify “ideal point estimation into 
a single measurement framework,” facilitating comparisons of “ideal points across states, 
institutions, incumbency status, and time” that otherwise would be “overly complicated or 
infeasible” with PAJID scores and other measures (Bonica and Woodruff 2014, 32).  
 After coding these case-specific variables, I coded for several state-level variables. To 
account for the textual attributes of each state’s search-and-seizure analog (H5), I created a 
dummy variable. I assigned a 0 if the text and structure of a state’s analog did not suggest 
greater protection than the Fourth Amendment and a 1 if the text or structure of the analog 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 32 Of the 218 cases in the population, CF scores exist for 138 observations. For the vast 
majority of these cases, I was able to include a CF measure of the majority opinion’s author. If a 
score was not available for the majority opinion author, I included CF scores for the next most senior 
judge in the majority. For 80 cases, I was unable to locate a CF score for the opinion author or any 
other member of the majority.  
 While it is somewhat concerning that Bonica and Woodruff (2014) do not list CF scores for a 
sizable number of state high court justices, this would only pose a serious problem if Bonica and 
Woodruff failed to compile these scores for some systematic reason that might skew my statistical 
analysis (if, for example, they excluded all liberal justices or all appointed justices).  
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did suggest greater protection than the Fourth Amendment.33 Similarly, to gauge the 
impact of states’ explicit constitutional privacy provisions (H6), I coded a dummy variable. I 
assigned a 0 if a state constitution contained neither a separate privacy provision nor a 
state analog that includes clear mention of citizens’ privacy interests. For states whose 
constitutions contain either a separate privacy provision or a state analog that includes 
clear mention of citizens’ privacy interests, I assigned a 1.34  
 To account for judicial selection and the effect of judicial elections (H10), I coded 
another dummy variable. I designated a 0 for decisions from states whose judges are elected 
and a 1 for decisions from states whose judges are appointed.35 To test the role of citizen 
ideology on state courts’ third-party doctrine decisions (H11), I created a dummy variable, 
assigning a 0 if a state court decision fell in close proximity to a presidential election in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 33 I also created an ordinal variable to account for the spectrum of privacy protection 
suggested by search-and-seizure analogs. I assigned a 0 if the state’s analog was textually identical 
in structure and syntax to the Fourth Amendment, a 1 if the analog differed from the Fourth 
Amendment in structure or syntax but still did not suggest more robust privacy protections, and a 2 
if the analog’s text clearly suggested a higher level of privacy protection by explicitly mentioning 
“privacy” or the “right to privacy.”  
 My final logit models remain stable regardless of whether I include the dummy or ordinal 
variable. For the ordinal variable, 0 and 1 are quite similar in that both involve analogs whose text 
and structure suggest protection coextensive with the Fourth Amendment. Thus, I use the dummy 
variable in my final analyses. !! 34 I also created an ordinal variable. I designated a 0 for states whose constitutions contain 
neither a separate privacy provision nor a search-and-seizure analog that functions as a privacy 
provision, as signaled by mentions of “privacy” or the “right to privacy.” I designated a 1 for states 
without a separate privacy provision but whose analogs include an explicit mention of privacy, and 
assigned a 2 for states whose constitution contains a separate state privacy provision.  
 My final logit models remain stable regardless of whether I include the dummy or ordinal 
variable. For the ordinal variable, state analogs with explicit mentions of privacy interests (1) are in 
many ways the functional equivalents of separate, explicit state privacy provisions (2). Because the 
dummy variable captures the dichotomy I am interested in—between constitutions that reference 
privacy interests and constitutions that do not—I use the dummy variable in my final analyses. !! 35 I also created an ordinal variable by coding each state’s formal judicial selection methods 
on a scale from partisan elections to merit selection plans, designating a 1 for partisan elections, a 2 
for non-partisan elections, a 3 for gubernatorial or legislative appointments, and a 4 for merit 
selection in which state judges are chosen through a combination of commission-based 
recommendations, gubernatorial appointments, and retention elections. 
 My final logit models remain stable regardless of whether I include the dummy or ordinal 
variable. Because I am interested in the dichotomy between elected and appointed judges, and the 
dummy variable best captures this dichotomy, I use the dummy variable in my final analyses.  
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which a majority of the state’s voters selected a Republican candidate and a 1 if a decision 
fell in proximity to a presidential election in which a majority of the state’s voters selected a 
Democratic candidate.36  
 To assess the role of a state’s third-party precedent (H3) and nearby states’ third-
party holdings (H13), I coded two dummy variables. If a decision in my population was not 
preceded by precedent that afforded greater protection to third-party materials under the 
state constitution, I designated a 0. If a decision was preceded by precedent that afforded 
greater protection for third-party material under the state analog or privacy provision, I 
assigned a 1. To gauge the influence of other states’ third-party doctrine holdings, I 
examined rulings within the eleven federal circuits, assigning a 0 if a decision was not 
preceded by a ruling in another state in its federal circuit offering greater protection to 
third-party materials. I assigned a 1 if a decision was preceded by a more protective ruling 
by another state in its federal circuit.37   
 To take stock of a state’s exclusionary rule history and thereby assess the role of 
historical state search-and-seizure protections (H7), I utilized the Appendix in Elkins v. 
United States (1961), an exclusionary rule case that preceded the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
incorporation of the rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio (1961). The Elkins Appendix 
accounts for how each state, except Hawai’i and Alaska, handled illegally obtained evidence 
in criminal trials prior to Elkins. Based on the categories included in the Appendix, I 
created an ordinal variable, designating a 0 for states that allowed unlawfully obtained 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 36 I consulted the National Archives’ Electoral College database for historical election results 
from each state.  See http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/votes/index.html.  
 37 I also made use of Westlaw reporting zones to create a second dummy variable, assigning a 
0 if a decision was not preceded by a ruling in another state in its Westlaw zone offering greater 
protection to third-party materials and assigning a 1 if a decision was preceded by a more protective 
ruling by another state in its Westlaw zone. Westlaw divides the fifty states into seven reporting 
zones: Pacific, Northwestern, Southwestern, Northeastern, Southern, Southeastern, and Atlantic. 
See https://lawschool.westlaw.com/userguides/nationalreporter/west_map_reg_v5.html.  
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evidence to be admitted at criminal trials before incorporation; a 1 for states that made 
unlawfully obtained evidence partially excludable at criminal trials before Elkins; and a 2 
for states that adopted the exclusionary rule before its incorporation, requiring the 
exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence in criminal trials.  
 Finally, to assess the role of state courts’ prestige (H14), I use rankings developed by 
Caldeira (1983) that span from 1, the court cited most frequently, to 50, the court cited least 
frequently. Caldeira’s rankings date to 1975, near the middle of the temporal span of my 
data (1952-2014) and one year before the United States Supreme Court decided United 
States v. Miller (1976). While it would be ideal to include state court prestige rankings for 
the specific years in which each of the cases in my data set were decided, no such ranking 
exists. Caldeira’s rankings provide the best available indicator of state courts’ prestige.  
 To test my hypotheses and assess the effect of my independent variables on the 
outcomes of state appellate third-party doctrine decisions, I use bivariate and multivariate 
analyses. Because my dependent variable is categorical and takes only one of two possible 
values, it violates the assumptions required for ordinary least squares regression. Thus, a 
logit model offers the most appropriate multivariate statistical approach for my project. We 
turn now to a discussion of my results and their significance for understandings of new 
judicial federalism and state courts’ treatment of the federal third-party doctrine.  
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VI. Results 
 My analysis provides evidence that, under certain conditions, state appellate judges 
engage in Justice’s Brennan’s model of judicial federalism. When deciding whether to 
extend the “independent protective force” of state constitutions to third-party materials, 
judges seem to consider state constitutional privacy guarantees, precedent in their own and 
other states, and their reputation among other state courts (Brennan 1977, 491). 
Ideologically liberal judges appear more likely to protect third-party material. My findings 
suggest that, as the legal model predicts, state judges feel the weight of constitutional 
provisions and precedent but, as the attitudinal and audience-based models posit, also look 
to their ideological preferences and the behavior of other courts.  
 First and foremost, this thesis provides an up-to-date look at the scope of state courts’ 
protection of third-party materials. Since 1952, twenty-two states have offered higher 
protection to third-party records and information on at least one occasion. Of those twenty-
two states, five have been particularly active: California, Colorado, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, and Washington. Of the 218 decisions included in my data set, 58 provide 
greater protection for third-party materials than the United States Supreme Court 
requires. While many of these decisions concern issues like bank records, telephone records, 
and garbage left for collection (the issues covered in Miller, Smith, and Greenwood), some 
concern third-party issues not yet considered by the United States Supreme Court but still 
covered by the rationale of federal third-party doctrine precedent. Such issues include 
medical records, credit card records, Cell Service Location Information (CSLI), and Internet 
Service Provider (ISP) subscriber information. See Table 2 below for a breakdown of each 
state’s third-party rulings from 1952 to 2014:  
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Table 2. State-Level Protection of Third Party Materials38 
 (1952 – 2014) 
 
State Total Number of Third-Party 
Cases 
Decisions 
Offering Greater 
Protection to 
Third-Party 
Material 
% of 
Decisions 
Offering 
Greater 
Protection 
Third Party Materials 
Protected 
Alabama 4 0 0%  
Alaska 5 1 20% Garbage left for collection 
Arizona 1 0 0%  
Arkansas 3 0 0%  
California 8 8 100% 
Garbage left for collection 
Bank Records 
Trust Account Records* 
Credit Card Records 
Name, address, phone # w/ 
telephone company 
Telephone Call Records (2) 
Motel / Hotel Telephone 
Records 
Colorado 10 8 80% 
Bank Records (4)* (1 civil) 
Telephone Call Records (4) 
Tax Return Records 
Connecticut 5 0 0%  
Delaware 0 0 0%  
Florida 6 3 50% 
Bank Records 
Telephone Call Records 
Real-Time CSLI 
Georgia 6 0 0%  
Hawaii 4 2 50% Garbage left for collection  Telephone Call Records 
Idaho 6 1 16.7% Telephone Call Records 
Illinois 6 3 50% 
Bank Records 
Telephone Call Records 
Medical Records* !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 38 Entries marked with an asterisk (*) represent civil cases. Of the 58 decisions in which a 
state court provided greater protection to third-party materials, only five were in civil cases. 
     Entries marked with a double asterisk (**) represent cases decided on the basis of a state 
statute, not a state constitution. Of the 58 cases enumerated here, only three were decided on state 
statutory grounds. While cases decided on statutory grounds do not represent instances of new 
judicial federalism in the purest sense, Justice Brennan (1977, 503) mentions state statutes when he 
urges state courts to use their “common law, statutes, and constitutions” to “breathe new life into the 
federal due process clause.” I ran logit tests where these three cases were coded as both “0” (not 
engaging in new judicial federalism) and “1” (engaging in new judicial federalism). The model 
remains stable under both conditions. Because these cases do result in greater third-party 
protection, I code them as “1” in my final analysis.  
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Indiana 8 1 12.5% Garbage left for collection by private trash collectors 
Iowa 2 0 0%  
Kansas 4 0 0%  
Kentucky 2 0 0%  
Louisiana 4 1 25% Prescription Records 
Maine 1 0 0%  
Maryland 2 0 0%  
Massachusetts 8 2 25% 
Garbage left for collection 
on commercial property 
Historical CSLI 
Michigan 5 0 0%  
Minnesota 8 1 12.5% Telephone Call Records** 
Mississippi 0 0 0%  
Missouri 0 0 0%  
Montana 5 2 40% 
Employee Personnel 
Records* 
Blood Alcohol Test Results 
Nebraska 4 0 0%  
Nevada 2 0 0%  
New Hampshire 7 2 28.6% Bank Records** Garbage left for collection 
New Jersey 8 7 87.5% 
Telephone Toll Records 
Hotel Telephone Records 
Garbage left for collection 
Bank Records 
Utility Records 
ISP Subscriber Information 
Real-Time CSLI 
New Mexico 3 2 66.7% Garbage left for collection in motel 
New York 7 0 0%  
North Carolina 3 0 0%  
North Dakota 8 0 0%  
Ohio 4 0 0%  
Oklahoma 4 1 25% Bank Records*  ** 
Oregon 6 1 16.7% Garbage left for collection 
Pennsylvania 5 4 80% 
Bank Records 
Telephone Call Records (2) 
Blood Alcohol Test Results 
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Rhode Island 3 0 0%  
South Carolina 1 0 0%  
South Dakota 3 0 0%  
Tennessee 2 0 0%  
Texas 9 1 11.1% Blood Alcohol Test Results39 
Utah 2 1 50% Bank Records 
Vermont 3 2 66.7% Prescription Records Garbage left for collection 
Virginia 0 0 0%  
Washington 7 4 57.1% 
Telephone Toll Records 
Unlisted phone number, 
address stored w/ third 
party 
Garbage left for collection 
Bank Records 
West Virginia 1 0 0%  
Wisconsin 8 0 0%  
Wyoming 5 0 0%  
 
Total 218 58   
 
 Of the 58 decisions in my data set that exceed the protection required by federal 
doctrine, nearly 85 percent were decided after relevant federal third-party rulings (Miller 
(1976) or, for garbage cases, Greenwood (1988)). While I cannot claim with certainty that 
federal third-party precedent caused states to engage in judicial federalism, state courts’ 
citations of federal third-party precedent provide compelling evidence that the bulk of 
judicial federalism in state third-party rulings has occurred in response to U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent. Of the 58 decisions in which state courts protected third-party material on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 39 In State v. Comeaux 818 S.W.2d 46 (1991), a plurality of judges on the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals held that citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy in blood alcohol test 
results stored with a hospital. Texas courts have since rejected this plurality decision as non-binding 
and ruled that citizens enjoy no reasonable expectations of privacy in blood alcohol test results. I 
include the decision in the count because, regardless of subsequent reversal, the decision represents 
an instance of a state court offering greater protection to third-party materials. The model remains 
stable regardless of how I code this case.   
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independent state grounds, 34 include negative citations of Miller, Smith, and Greenwood, 
signaling these courts’ clear intention to break from the federal third-party doctrine. Thus, 
even descriptive analysis suggests that many state appellate courts are intentionally 
engaging in a form of judicial federalism in their third-party rulings.  
 A few examples demonstrate the extent to which many state appellate courts 
consciously engage in judicial federalism using their state analogs and privacy provisions. 
In State v. Thompson 114 Idaho 746 (1988, 751), the Idaho Supreme Court adopted the 
“dissenting comments in Smith” in holding that citizens of Idaho have reasonable 
expectations of privacy in the telephone numbers they dial such that telephone call records 
obtained via warrantless installation of a pen register should be suppressed. The majority 
asserted that until the U.S. Supreme Court overrules Smith and establishes “for the nation 
the protection to which we believe those who use telephones in Idaho are entitled,” Article 
1, Section 17 of the Idaho constitution, Idaho’s search-and-seizure analog, will “stand as a 
bulwark against the intrusions of pen registers” (State v. Thompson, 1988, 751).  
 An almost identical pen register case from Hawai’i demonstrates the power of a state 
privacy provision in third-party rulings. In State v. Rothman 70 Haw. 546 (1989, 556), the 
Supreme Court of Hawai’i ruled that even if the court were willing to adopt Smith’s 
rationale “with respect to Article I, Section 7 of our State Constitution, which parallels the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Hawaii Constitution has, in 
addition, an expressed right of privacy set forth in Article I, Section 6.” Given Hawai’i’s 
additional constitutional layer of privacy protection, the state high court reasoned, “persons 
using telephones in the State of Hawaii have a reasonable expectation of privacy, with 
respect to the telephone numbers they call” (State v. Rothman, 1989, 556). 
 While these two rulings offer a glimpse into explicit instances of judicial federalism, 
subsequent decisions illustrate the fluidity of state courts’ third-party jurisprudence. Since 
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State v. Thompson (1988), Idaho appellate courts have declined to offer greater protection 
under state constitutional grounds to power consumption records, garbage left for 
collection, bank records, and HIV test results, citing federal third-party doctrine precedent 
favorably in each of these rulings.40 Similarly, following its decision in State v. Rothman 
(1989), the Supreme Court of Hawai’i gave no deference to its constitutional privacy 
provision when in State v. Klattenhoff 71 Haw. 598 (1990, 552), it adopted the “rule set 
forth in United States v. Miller . . . finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in personal 
bank records.” Thus, while this thesis sheds light on the volume of state court activity 
surrounding the federal third-party doctrine, my data also demonstrates that protection for 
third-party records and materials sometimes fluctuates within states.   
 My dependent variable indicates whether, in a third-party ruling, a state court 
reaches a decision that provides greater protection than required by the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s relevant third-party precedent. Because my dependent variable is coded as either 0 
(no evidence of judicial federalism) or 1 (clear presence of judicial federalism), a logit model 
is appropriate. To examine the factors that might account for judicial federalism in third-
party rulings, I conducted a multivariate analysis, running two separate logit models. A 
measure for one of the key variables in my analysis, judicial ideology, is not available for all 
the third-party decisions included in my data set. Because Bonica (2014) offered a judicial 
ideology measure for only 138 of the 218 cases in my population, running the model with 
judicial ideology excludes 80 decisions for which no measure of judicial ideology is available. 
Thus, it was important to run the model both with and without judicial ideology to 
determine whether the exclusion of cases missing an ideology measure disrupted my !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 40 See State v. Kluss 125 Idaho 14 (1993), applying federal doctrine to utility records; State v. 
Donato 135 Idaho 469 (2001) and State v. McCall 135 Idaho 885 (2001), applying federal doctrine to 
garbage left for collection; State v. Patterson 139 Idaho 858 (2003), applying federal doctrine to bank 
records; State v. Mubita 145 Idaho 925 (2008), applying federal doctrine to HIV test results.  
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findings. The first model does not incorporate judicial ideology; the second includes judicial 
ideology.41 The results of both models are reported in Table 3 below:  
 
 Table 3. State Appellate Third-Party Rulings 
 
Variable Coefficient  
(Model 1) 
Standard Error 
(Model 1) 
Coefficient 
(Model 2) 
Standard Error  
(Model 2) 
Court Level 1.26** .492 .763 .942 
Time of Decision in 
Relation to USSC 
Third Party 
Doctrine (TPD) 
Precedent 
-.039 .740 -.117 1.10 
Issue Presented in 
Relation to USSC 
TPD Precedent 
.149 .475 -.162 .554 
State Analog – 
Level of Privacy 
Protection Implied 
-.749 .679 -1.07 .926 
State 
Constitutional 
Privacy Guarantee 
2.28*** .680 2.79** .976 
Statements of 
Interpretive 
Approach 
.505 .60   
Previous State 
TPD Holdings 1.18** .424 1.36** .519 
TPD Holdings in 
Same Federal 
Circuit 
.872* .481 1.22** .542 
Pre-Mapp 
Exclusionary Rule 
Adoption 
-.395 .267 -.421 .323 
Crime -1.01 .643 -.981 .812 
Judicial Selection 
Method .530 .438 .820 .574 
State Citizenry 
Political Ideology -.426 .440 -.633 .562 
State Court 
Reputation -.057*** .014 -.042** .017 
Judicial Ideology   -.578* .340 
 
*=Significant at the .1 level; **=Significant at the .01 level; ***=Significant at the .001 level 
Model 1 (without Judicial Ideology): n=218; Pseudo R2=0.3051 
Model 2 (with Judicial Ideology): n=138; Pseudo R2=0.2975 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 41 Model 2 includes judicial ideology but excludes my measure for statements of interpretive 
approach. Once cases without a judicial ideology score were excluded in Model 2, a state court’s 
failure to cite a statement of interpretive approach perfectly predicted adoption of federal doctrine. 
Without variance, Stata drops the variable from Model 2 altogether. The model remains stable.  
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 My findings validate several theoretical assumptions of the legal, attitudinal, and 
audience-focused models of judicial decisionmaking. The significance of state privacy 
guarantees and prior third-party holdings provides support for the legal model’s assertion 
that state judges give deference to the syntax and structure of legal texts, as well as the 
principle of stare decisis. Baum’s (2006, 104) audience-based model predicts that judges will 
act in ways that “enhance their standing” among their judicial peers. My findings support 
this contention: judges were more likely to engage in judicial federalism if another state 
court within the same federal circuit had already done so and as their prestige among other 
state courts rose. Lastly, my findings support the dominant assumption in the literature on 
judicial decisionmaking that judicial ideology matters: as state judges became more 
ideologically liberal, their willingness to protect third-party material under state 
constitutional provisions increased. While this suggests that ideology shapes third-party 
rulings, the significance of legal and audience-based variables runs counter to Segal and 
Spaeth’s (2002) argument that judges’ policy preferences trump all other motivations.42  
 As Table 3 demonstrates, most of my independent variables perform consistently 
across both models.  Regardless of whether I include judicial ideology, several variables 
remain significant and in the expected directions. The presence of a state constitutional 
privacy guarantee, state court precedent offering greater protection to third-party material, 
precedent offering greater protection by a state court within the same federal circuit, and 
Caldeira’s measure of state court prestige all play some role in state appellate judges’ third-
party doctrine rulings. The court level (intermediate appellate or high court) is significant 
in Model 1 but falls short of statistical significance once I incorporate judicial ideology in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 42 As noted in previous sections, Segal and Spaeth (2002) would argue that the attitudinal 
model they envision applies only to U.S. Supreme Court justices, who are uninhibited by the 
possibility of judicial review by a higher court. Because the independent state grounds doctrine 
provides at least state high court justices with an avenue to avoid judicial review, I believe their 
model can be appropriately applied to state appellate judges.  
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Model 2. Once added in Model 2, judicial ideology becomes statistically significant.  
 These results lend support to several of my hypotheses. Of particular note, my 
analyses provide evidence that when a court examines the third-party doctrine in a state 
whose constitution includes some recognition of citizens’ privacy interests—either in a 
separate constitutional provision or by explicit mention in a search-and-seizure analog—the 
court is more likely to protect third-party material under their state constitution (H6). The 
variable remains significant regardless of whether judicial ideology appears in the model. 
This finding lends credence to the legal model’s assertion that the syntax and structure of 
legal texts shape judicial decisionmaking. Since the U.S. Constitution does not reference 
privacy, state judges may view an explicit state constitutional privacy reference as a reason 
to provide greater privacy protection than the Fourth Amendment requires. Interestingly, 
the level of protection suggested by the text of a state’s search-and-seizure analog (H5) is 
not significant in either model. This indicates that while general textual attributes of a 
state’s analog may be immaterial, specific mention of privacy interests or the presence of a 
separate constitutional privacy provision provides a conspicuous cue that a state 
constitution should provide more robust privacy protection.  
 My results’ affirmation of this tenet of the legal model sits alongside support for the 
attitudinal model. Once added in Model 2, Bonica and Woodruff’s (2014) measure of judicial 
ideology is significant in the expected direction: as the author of a given opinion grew more 
ideologically liberal, so, too, did the likelihood that the opinion would offer greater 
protection to third-party records than the Fourth Amendment provides (H8). Consider how 
the addition of judicial ideology in Model 2 alters the significance of the state court level. 
Absent a measure for ideology in Model 1, state high courts appear more likely than mid-
level appellate courts to reject the federal third-party doctrine under state constitutions, 
presumably because state high court justices can avoid federal review by basing third-party 
!! 53 
rulings on independent state grounds. Once judicial ideology is added in Model 2, however, 
the court-level variable falls just outside the level of statistical significance.  
 While this change probably reflects the exclusion of 80 observations in Model 2 
because of missing ideology measures, it might also signal that state high courts are more 
likely to engage in judicial federalism because they have more freedom to enact their 
ideological preferences, not just because they have less fear of higher court review. Thus, 
the significance of the court-level variable in Model 1 offers only moderate support for my 
hypothesis that state high courts will be more likely to protect third-party materials (H9). 
The changes that occur once I control for judicial ideology lend support to my hypothesis 
that liberal judges will be more disposed to protect third-party records under state 
constitutions (H8). Though the significance of other legal and audience-based variables 
precludes me from concluding that ideology alone shapes third-party rulings, my results 
support the attitudinal model’s assertion that ideological preferences inform judicial 
decisionmaking. Liberalism seems to be associated with a greater propensity to engage in 
judicial federalism in third-party rulings, though my results do not make clear why this is 
so. Liberal judges may be motivated to protect third-party material by a heightened desire 
to protect criminal suspects or, perhaps, a more general inclination to develop state 
constitutional law along the progressive lines delineated by Justice Brennan.  
 On the whole, then, both constitutional texts and ideological values appear to 
influence judges’ third-party doctrine rulings, with modest evidence suggesting that the 
possibility of review may also enter judges’ calculus. Three other variables exhibit 
statistical significance across both models. The presence of state court precedent protecting 
third-party materials under state constitutional provisions was significant in the expected 
direction: if a state court has previously protected third-party records or information, the 
court appears more likely to do so in subsequent cases (H3). Similarly, the presence of 
!! 54 
precedent protecting third-party materials by state courts located in the same federal 
circuit has a statistically significant effect on the third-party rulings of other courts’ in the 
same circuit. If a state appellate court in a given federal circuit extends state constitutional 
protection to third-party materials, other courts in the same federal circuit are more likely 
to do so (H13). Finally, Caldeira’s (1983) measure of state court prestige remained 
significant across both models: the more prestigious the state appellate court, the more 
likely the court was to reject the federal third-party doctrine (H14).  
 These results offer support for assumptions underlying the legal and audience-
centered models of judicial decisionmaking. As the legal model predicts, it appears that 
state judges feel at least somewhat constrained by precedent when deciding whether to 
protect third-party materials under state constitutions. This respect for precedent might 
bespeak judges’ genuine commitment to stare decisis, or it might suggest that precedent 
serves as a “constraint on [judges] acting on their personal preferences” (Knight and 
Epstein 1996, 1021). That state courts are more likely to engage in judicial federalism if 
other state courts in their federal circuit have already protected the third-party material in 
question suggests that, as Baum (2006) and Latzer (1991, 97) predict, state judges look to 
“sister state courts” for cues about the “latest development[s] in state law.” This result 
supports Baum’s assertion that the “judicial community” constitutes a “highly salient 
audience” for state court judges (Baum 2006, 104).43 Finally, the significance of state court 
prestige provides support for Caldeira’s assertion that some state appellate courts are 
“more influential than others” (Caldeira 1983, 84). As a state court’s standing among other 
state courts rises, it may feel emboldened to capitalize on its prestige and break from the 
federal third-party doctrine.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 43 The significance of other third-party holdings in the same federal circuit comports with my 
qualitative observation that the decisions in my data set almost always cite other state courts’ third-
party rulings.  
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 Of course, it is entirely possible that some antecedent variable or variables—perhaps 
judicial ideology or the presence of a state constitutional privacy guarantee—explains the 
significance of state court prestige and precedent within both individual states and federal 
circuits. Though the principle of stare decisis suggests that prior rejections of the third-
party doctrine will lead to subsequent rejections, proponents of the attitudinal model might 
counter this assertion with the claim that judges show deference to progressive third-party 
precedent only when it suits preexisting ideological preferences in favor of continuing to 
protect third-party material (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 76-77). This attitudinal counterclaim 
is somewhat supported by my qualitative observation that many state courts’ third-party 
jurisprudence has fluctuated between 1952 and 2014; a court’s deference to precedent 
protecting third-party material may vary as ideological factions on the court shift over time.  
  The attitudinal model might also posit that judicial ideology undergirds the 
significance of state court prestige and other courts’ rulings in the same federal circuit. 
Motivated primarily by ideological preferences, state judges may look only to third-party 
rulings in their federal circuit that support desired policy outcomes. What seems like 
sensitivity to the “judicial audience” may, in fact, represent calculated attention to third-
party rulings within the federal circuit that align with judges’ ideological views of the third-
party doctrine. Similarly, some third variable like judicial ideology might account for the 
significance of state court prestige. Caldeira (1983, 103) notes that more prestigious courts 
tend to be ideologically liberal. As political science research and my own findings suggest, 
ideological liberalism tends to be associated with support for expansive civil liberties 
protections. Thus, the tendency of more prestigious courts to engage in judicial federalism 
may provide further affirmation that liberal judges are more likely to protect third-party 
materials under state constitutional provisions. While it is certainly possible that all three 
of these variables are motivated by another variable like judicial ideology or the presence of 
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constitutional privacy guarantees, my findings still provide evidence that a state court’s 
third-party precedent, third-party rulings in the same federal circuit, and state court 
prestige exert some influence over state courts’ third-party jurisprudence.  
 I find no support for several of my hypotheses. The variable indicating whether a 
decision in my population occurred before or after relevant federal third-party rulings did 
not achieve statistical significance (H1a, H1b). Similarly, my variable capturing whether 
the issue presented in a case matched an issue decided in Miller, Smith, and Greenwood 
failed to reach significance (H2a, H2b). For both variables, deficient variance might 
explain the lack of significance. Almost 90 percent of the cases in my data set occur after 
relevant federal third-party holdings. Over 70 percent concern the issues decided in Miller, 
Smith, and Greenwood (financial records, telephone records, and garbage left for collection). 
These high percentages, coupled with the negative citations of federal precedent mentioned 
at the beginning of this section, provide compelling evidence that between 1952 and 2014, 
state courts were more likely to engage in judicial federalism when the case fell after 
federal third-party rulings and concerned the same issues addressed by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Miller, Smith, and Greenwood. Ultimately, however, neither of my models 
supports this conclusion.  
 A state’s treatment of the exclusionary rule prior to incorporation in Mapp (1961) did 
not significantly predict the variance in state appellate third-party rulings (H7). While 
legal constraints like precedent and state constitutional privacy guarantees seem to shape 
judges’ third-party rulings, a state’s historical level of search-and-seizure protection does 
not appear to exert influence. Several factors might explain why this variable falls short of 
statistical significance. Judges may simply be indifferent to their state’s historical level of 
search-and-seizure protection. Alternatively, a state’s pre-Mapp treatment of the 
exclusionary rule may not offer the most salient measure of historical protection of criminal 
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suspects. Regardless, my findings run counter to the legal model’s suggestion that legal 
history constrains judicial decisionmaking.  
 Neither the method of judicial selection (H10) nor the ideological leanings of a state’s 
citizenry achieved statistical significance (H11). Unlike many studies that find effects of 
judicial elections on case outcomes, my results suggest that elected judges are no more 
likely than appointed judges to adopt federal third-party precedent. While Baum (2006, 61) 
is likely correct that judges have a “strong interest in retaining their positions,” elected 
judges may only feel electoral pressure in a subset of high-profile cases, which may not 
encompass third-party decisions. My finding that citizens’ ideology does not significantly 
predict the variance in third-party rulings undercuts Baum’s assertion that judges, 
particularly elected judges, keep abreast of the citizenry’s ideological mood. My results 
indicate that while judges care about enacting their own ideological preferences, they may 
be apathetic about citizens’ preferences. This comports with the above finding about judicial 
selection: if judges do not feel electoral pressure when deciding third-party cases, we would 
have less reason to expect them to respond to fluctuations in citizens’ ideology.  
 Lastly, the variable measuring violent or non-violent crime failed to reach significance 
(H12). The theoretical assumptions underlying my hypothesis that judges would be more 
likely to engage in judicial federalism in cases involving non-violent crime centered on 
Baum’s prediction that elected judges attempt to project a “tough on crime” persona to 
voters (Baum 2006, 62). Since judicial elections do not appear to hold sway in third-party 
rulings, it makes sense that judges might also be less concerned about appearing “tough on 
crime” in third-party cases that involve violent offenses.  
 The variable assessing statements of interpretive approach about how judges should 
interpret search-and-seizure analogs in relation to the Fourth Amendment presents a few 
problems. The variable is not significant in Model 1. Once I added judicial ideology in Model 
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2, the variable drops out of the model because it perfectly predicts the adoption of federal 
third-party precedent in the 138 cases for which a judicial ideology measure was available. 
It is possible, however, that the failure of a citation to a statement of interpretive approach 
to reach statistical significance is an artifact of its measurement. That is, the variable may 
not achieve significance because the way I operationalize it fails to capture the actual 
degree of protection suggested by statements of interpretive approach but accounts only for 
whether a court cited a statement or did not cite a statement. I operationalized the variable 
this way because 49 of the 218 cases in my data set issue from state courts whose precedent 
contains no statement about how to interpret the search-and-seizure analog in relation to 
the Fourth Amendment. The absence of statements in so many cases makes it impossible to 
craft a proper ordinal variable for all observations, as this ordinal variable would inevitably 
jump from “0” (no statement) to “1” (a statement that implies lockstep interpretation with 
the Fourth Amendment) before moving up the spectrum to statements that imply greater 
privacy protection. As mentioned in previous sections, movement from “0” and “1” would not 
necessarily entail a transition from a statement implying less protection to a statement 
implying more protection, since the absence of a statement gives no information about how 
an analog should be interpreted in relation to the Fourth Amendment (see footnote 29).   
 To better understand the role of statements of interpretive approach, I examined the 
outcomes of the 169 cases for which statements of interpretive approach exist. For this 
analysis, I coded statements on a three-point ordinal scale ranging from those that suggest 
lockstep interpretation with the Fourth Amendment to those that indicate a higher level of 
privacy protection under the state analog than available under the Fourth Amendment. 
The results of this analysis are displayed in Table 4 below:  
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 Table 4. Subset – Cases Decided in States with Statements of 
Interpretive Approach 
 
Case Outcome Statement of Approach Total 
 
Suggests 
Lockstep 
Interpretation 
With Fourth 
Am. 
Analog May Go 
Beyond Fourth 
Amendment 
Analog Offers 
Greater 
Protection than 
Fourth Am. 
 
Applies USSC 
TPD Holdings 
 
81.58% 
(31 cases) 
77.55% 
(76 cases) 
36.36% 
(12 cases) 119 cases 
Rejects USSC 
TPD Holdings 
 
18.42% 
(7 cases) 
22.45% 
(22 cases) 
63.64% 
(21 cases) 50 cases 
Total 38 98 33 169 cases 
Pr = 0.000 
Pearson chi2 = 23.036 
 
 As Table 4 demonstrates, the level of protection suggested by statements of 
interpretive approach seems to correlate with certain types of case outcomes. Cases decided 
in states whose statements of approach suggest lockstep interpretation with the Fourth 
Amendment overwhelmingly provided the level of protection offered in the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s third-party precedent, with almost 82 percent embracing the federal third-party 
doctrine. However, a substantial majority (63 percent) of the cases decided in states whose 
precedent includes assertions that the state analog provides greater protection than the 
Fourth Amendment did provide greater protection than required by Miller, Smith, and 
Greenwood. Most of the cases (77 percent) decided in states whose precedent included 
declarations that state courts were free to offer higher levels of privacy protection under 
search-and-seizure analogs than the Fourth Amendment provides resulted in applications 
of federal third-party precedent, though a significant number (22 percent) resulted in 
rejections of the federal third-party doctrine. While this variable does not reach statistical 
significance when I operationalize it so as to include both states with and without 
statements of approach, the chi2 statistic in Table 4 confirms that among those states with 
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a statement of interpretive approach, a statistically significant relationship exists between 
the level of protection suggested by a statement of approach and third-party case outcomes.   
 Overall, twenty-two states have protected third-party records and information under 
their state constitutions on at least one occasion from 1952 to 2014. Much of this state court 
activity has occurred after, and likely in response to, federal third-party holdings like 
United States v. Miller (1976), Smith v. Maryland (1979) and California v. Greenwood 
(1988). Perhaps most important, my analysis affirms tenets of the legal and attitudinal 
models by providing evidence that ideological liberalism and state constitutional privacy 
guarantees play an important role in judges’ third-party rulings. These findings echo a 
plethora of research on the clout of judicial ideology, as well as a smaller body of 
scholarship that finds a significant relationship between state constitutional attributes and 
case outcomes (Lovell 2012; Emmert and Traut 1992). A state court’s third-party precedent, 
third-party holdings in a state court’s federal circuit, and state court prestige all help 
predict the variance in state appellate courts’ third-party holdings. Finally, my results lend 
moderate support to my hypotheses that the possibility of judicial review and the level of 
protection suggested by statements of interpretive approach play a role in judges’ treatment 
of the federal third-party doctrine. Taken together, these findings indicate that when judges 
decide to protect third-party materials under their state analogs and privacy provisions, 
they do so to advance their own ideological preferences and prestige but also in deference to 
legal constraints like stare decisis and state constitutional privacy guarantees. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Every year, the Aspen Ideas Festival draws visionaries from all walks to lecture on 
art, science, and policy—a fitting venue for speculation about the future of the United 
States Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Speaking at the Festival in 
2013, Justice Elena Kagan surmised the challenges digital technology poses for the Court’s 
reasonable expectations of privacy standard. Of cases concerning wireless governmental 
surveillance and police tracking techniques that involve no “trespass on property,” Justice 
Kagan predicted that such cases will likely provide “a growth industry” for the Court for 
decades to come.44 The third-party doctrine articulated in Miller, Smith, and Greenwood 
will almost certainly play a crucial role in this burgeoning class of cases.    
 While it remains unclear whether the United States Supreme Court will ever turn 
from the third-party doctrine, we can look to state appellate courts for hints about how the 
doctrine might evolve in the twenty-first century. Since 2006—the endpoint for Henderson’s 
compendium of state appellate third-party holdings—at least 30 cases in 24 states have 
addressed the doctrine, with six states using their state constitutions to protect third-party 
records and information. Though many of these cases concern standard third-party issues 
like bank and telephone records, several involve emerging issues like text message records, 
real-time and historical Cell Service Location Information (CSLI), and Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) subscriber records. At least five state appellate cases issued after United 
States v. Jones (2012) cite Justice Sotomayor’s Jones concurrence positively.  
 The modern third-party doctrine emerged at the “dawn of the Information Age” 
(Slobogin 2011,17). When the Supreme Court decided United States v. Miller (1976) and 
Smith v. Maryland (1979), few Americans owned personal computers, Google did not exist, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 44 For Justice Kagan’s full remarks in an interview with Professor Jeffrey Rosen of the 
George Washington University Law School, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nm2Xke9jbNY.  
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and the iPhone had yet to become a fixture of everyday life. Much has changed. Since the 
mid-1990s, the volume of the “world’s recorded data has doubled every year,” and the 
computing power required to aggregate and analyze data has “increased geometrically” 
(Slobogin 2011, 17). These technological advances have expanded the third-party doctrine’s 
reach in ways the Burger and Rehnquist Courts could hardly have imagined possible. The 
third-party doctrine allows law enforcement to “access free and clear of Fourth Amendment 
constraints” an ever-expanding corpus of information voluntarily stored with third parties 
(Slobogin 2011, 17). We can safely conclude that the third-party doctrine will continue to 
pose fundamental questions about the meaning of privacy in a digital age.  
 This thesis makes clear that many state appellate courts have for decades acted on 
Justice Sotomayor’s call to “reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties” (United States 
v. Jones, 2012, 957). State appellate courts will likely continue to use their constitutions to 
reexamine the third-party doctrine. My findings suggest that ideological liberalism and the 
presence of constitutional privacy guarantees may well animate state courts’ efforts to 
square an increasingly thorny federal doctrine with a citizenry whose lives are more 
entwined than ever with third parties.  
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